To protect yourself from an upstream resolver using DNSSEC, you need to be doing something akin to a full recursive lookup yourself. This is a flaw in the DNSSEC design and a reason why DoH took off instead.

"SHA2 will never be broken in our lifetimes" is something I've heard JP Aumasson say many times, but that's based on the fact that there's no line of sight anywhere to techniques that could break it. But you can't say that about 1024 bit RSA.

* They pay for vulnerabilities without reliable exploits (more for vulnerabilities that are demonstrably reliable).

* They don't require you to actually build a reliable exploit chain.

* They pay up front, not in tranches.

* They work with essentially all comers, unlike the grey market, where you're generally subcontracting to sell your first few.

Further: a vulnerability is probably not worth that much either, even if it's a hypercapable vulnerability, because the grey market buys full enablement kits, not vulnerability information. People making 6 figures on vulnerabilities are selling fully enabled full chain exploit systems, not just intelligence about a sandbox escape.

https://dnssecmenot.fly.dev/

The PKI run by state-level actors isn't going to happen.

Really hard to understand why that hasn't happened yet!