I think SV was asking what onion services, which can't really use recaptcha, do to prevent the DDoS storm.

And I would imagine the answer is obscurity, since the dark web isn't nearly as well-mapped as the public web. That and some Anubis or other PoW would probably go far.

> The glutathione hepatic values in mice obtained by intraperitoneal injection of the ester are superimposable on controls and the oral LD50 was found to be greater than 2000 mg kg^-1 and the intraperitoneal LD50 was 1900 mg kg^-1 ...

That's for pyroglutamic and glutamic acid esters of paracetamol: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/8799871/

and more general analogs apparently can also be designed to not produce NAPQI:

> Thus, in 2020, N-sulpharyl-APAP prodrugs 39–40 (Fig. 11) were developed. [...] They are not hepatotoxic because they do not generate toxic metabolite NAPQI, even in concentrations equal to a toxic dose of APAP (600 mg kg^−1 in mice).

https://pubs.rsc.org/zh-tw/content/articlepdf/2024/ra/d4ra00... p. 9702.

These would probably require trials, though.

Say a particular finetune prioritizes profits right now and makes recommendations like "cut down on maintenance, you can make up for it later with your increased profits and their interest". It produces more profits, and wins the AB test. Later the chickens come home to roost.

You can reduce the problem by using long-term indicators, but then each AB test is very slow.

Biasing actual buying advice would be feasible, but it would have to be handled very carefully to not be too obvious.

[1] https://tmedweb.tulane.edu/pharmwiki/doku.php/acetaminophen

Virtual memory probably isn't what you meant, but take something like user privilege separation. It's usually considered a good idea to not run software as root. To interpret the statement generously, privilege separation does restrict immediate freedom: you have to escalate whenever you want to do system-level changes. But I think josephg's statement:

> Sandboxing gives users more control. Not less. Even if they use that control to turn off sandboxing, they still have more freedom because they get to decide if sandboxing is enabled or disabled.

can be directly transposed to user privilege separation. While it's true that escalating to root is more of a hassle than just running everything as root, in another sense it does provide more control because the user can run arbitrary code without being afraid that it will nuke their OS; and more freedom because you could always just run everything as root anyway.

Maybe josephg's sense of freedom and control is what you're saying there is a trade-off between. But the case of privilege separation shows that some trade-offs are such that they provide a lot of security for only a little bit of inconvenience, and that's a trade-off most people are willing to make.

Sometimes the trade-off may seem unacceptable because OS or software support isn't there yet. Like Vista's constant UAC annoyances in the case of privilege separation/escalation. But that doesn't mean that the fundamental idea of privilege levels is bad or that it must necessarily trade off too much convenience for control.

I think that's also what josephg is suggesting about sandboxing. He says that the clipboard problem could probably be fixed; then you say, "but there are other examples". What remains to be shown is whether the examples are inherent to sandboxing and must degrade a capabilities/sandbox approach to a level where the trade-off is unacceptable to most.

The service then links the token to your account and uses ordinary detection measures to see if you're spamming, flooding, phishing, whatever. If you do, the token gets blacklisted and you can no longer sign on to that service.

This isn't foolproof - you could still bribe random people on the street to be men/mules in the middle and do your flooding through them - but it's much harder than just spinning up ten thousand bots on a residential proxy.

[1] https://github.com/aw31/openai-imo-2025-proofs

[2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.15855 Appendix A

Domain names are a good example, because as skissane said, you could just make another DNS root. The trouble is convincing people (browsers) to use it. The problem in attempting to overturn Facebook isn't mainly the coding, either, but having a critical mass care. Those barriers don't seem like absolutes the way land is; they're just very high, high enough for those who control them to extract economic rent.

In city planning and building design, the problem is even more severe. The planner doesn't know what people are going to settle where, what their desired needs are (or are going to be), and so on. That doesn't mean that there's no such thing as an awful solution, nor that you can't say anything at all. (A house probably needs windows, and you probably shouldn't stick a polluting industrial zone right next to a bunch of them.) It just means that trying to "micromanage" a city or complex building fails - for the same reason that micromanaging an organization fails.

(This is a requisite variety or "seeing like a state" argument.)

It seems to me that any "paper trail" scheme of the sort you describe would have to solve the problems of DRM to work: making the elements that report on the real world (in this case, the CCD) tamper-proof, making the encryption key impossible to extract, designing robust watermarks to avoid analog holes, etc.

Here's a paper by Markus Schulze proposing such a method: https://aso.icann.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/schulze4.pd... He uses some very large districts, but it should work for smaller districts too.