There is nothing wrong with speechwriters. Various authors spilled out their thoughts in rough format and had writers turn them into better structured, prosed and understandable projections. Hand writing each sentence that is presented as an end-product to the reader doesn't solve that problem.

Forcibly coupling the two is an arbitrary choice that may be a valid tradeoff for some and not so for others, and not so for _all_ writing.

I'm not good at looping through a document with proper english prose. My writing is raw, particular, and I gloss over a lot of details. LLMs help me turn my shitty extensive notes in bad grammar and syntax, into shareable and understandable artifacts. They help me turn more of my thoughts into ingestable communication by others. Without AI, I communicate less of my thoughts due to friction. My thoughts are formed and authored and written, but not in a format consumable by anyone else.

Ebikes help older riders keep riding.

What matters is not just what you plan to do, but what your opponent thinks you'll do. The US in general believes that China wants to invade or control Taiwan in some way. This mere belief is sufficient to cause it to take action.

Whether China plans to actually invade or blockade Taiwan or not doesn't matter if the US thinks it will. AFAICT the US is convinced it will, and the mere threat of this is enough to justify Venezuela and Iran, I believe. Higher oil prices are less worse than no more semiconductors.

And I think Russia might have gained some territory, but at the cost of being completely sucked into the conflict, having lost strategically by (1) being unable to support and defend its proxies and (2) having its arsenal and technology thoroughly analyzed and proven ineffective against US weapons. All actors involved know this and it will not remain, but until solved this means that the US knows it can strike countries defended by Russian weapons, at least until counter measures are researched, developed and distributed. This is a temporary advantage and moment of clarity that lasts a few years, not a sustained advantage.

The risk of the US being equally sucked into Iran and suffering the same fate is very high. And China's best strategy here is probably to sit and wait and help US opponents keep the US busy for a while, like the US did on Ukraine with Russia.

(2) Iran has a temporary but unsustainable interest in constricting traffic, and it's not the only country who could impose a filter there. The mere credible threat of a strike on shipping is enough to stop it, so other countries basically have an equivalent capability to restrict traffic. And all countries, including Iran, are unable to sustain a prolonged closure. The current situation is an unstable, non-equilibrium situation for Iran and it's neighbors.

Overall, all of it doesn't really matter to the US because simply taking Iran off the supply chain of China is good for them. They spin the narrative about starting the war for a variety of other reasons so that they can justify the pain it inflicts on their allies (Korea, Japan - very dependent on those hydrocarbons too, and EU) and choke China's oil supplies without looking intentional. Last time the US overtly blockaded an asian nation's oil supplies, Pearl Harbour happened.

Which is another reason why China had such a structural incentive to move toward solar power, battery storage and renewables in general while also powering most of their early growth with dirty power plants.

I think Trump wants to be remembered for having neutered the China threat and having restored American supremacy and dynamism, and doesn't care too much about what it will cost at the next federal elections. I think he cares more about his legacy and wanting to be remembered as a historical figure on the strategic level. He's portrayed as being merely a fool with self interested dictatorial tendencies but I think attributing such simple intentions to him is self deception and leads to poor analysis. It doesn't pay to trivialize figures for disliking them or their actions.

Without taking camp here, I'll say that taking Trump for a fool is shortsighted, in my opinion.

(1) reducing oil shipments to China is good posturing for the US; hence Venezuela and Iran ahead of 2028. These are shaping operations. China suffers more from these conflicts than the US.

(2) Iran isn't the only one who can control passage throught the strait. All gulf countries can do so. If Iran can cheaply cut off passage, so can Saudi Arabia and UAE and everyone else there. They all have a long term mutual need in keeping this strait open.

All these recent analysis of conflicts in isolation, which always assume a lot of self-interest in disliked politicians, seem to make the analysts and authors blind to a much more probable and sensible grand strategy. Russia invading Ukraine and failing, has been the greatest strategic gift Russia could give to the US against China in setting the stage for shaping a defence of, and deterring an offensive on, Taiwan. Russia lost the ability to defend its proxies at a cost asymetrically small to the US. Hamas broke rank and allowed Israel to eventually decapitate Iran's proxies and air-defense step by step instead of all at once, setting the stage for the opportunity of the current war. And Russia being distracted also gave the US carte-blanche in Venezuela, not only via distraction but by proving that Russian air-defense isn't the thread it was thought to be.

The remaining strategic tension, in my humble opinion, is whether the US depletes its stockpiles too much without a caught up manufacturing capability, so that a Taiwan conflict becomes easy to win by default for China (via a blockade which would essentially be a cold war with few deaths and minimal damage) or if the weakened China (due to oil constraints) would be simply unable to attack in 2028, the strategic window when it can do so.

The situation, in my eyes, is evolving in a state where only two modes become dominant and both are slightly better for Taiwan.

We're in the midst of another abstraction level becoming the working layer - and that's not a small layer jump but a jump to a completely different plane. And I think once again, we'll benefit from getting tools that help us specify the high level concepts we intend, and ways to enforce that the generated code is correct - not necessarily fast or efficient but at least correct - same as compilers do. And this lift is happening on a much more accelerated timeline.

The problem of ensuring correctness of the generated code across all the layers we're now skipping is going to be the crux of how we manage to leverage LLM/agentic coding.

Maybe Cursor is TurboPascal.

edit: let me elaborate.

My point is that the chemical complexity (manufacturing uses) can be reproduced, and the energy storage density also can be. So really the gift of hydrocarbons under the ground is more that readily available energy is under our feet to help propel us towards higher levels sources of energy. IMO it’s a stepping stone and that’s effectively how humanity is using it.

To be honest, it makes no difference in my life if you believe or not what I'm saying. And from my perspective, it's just a bit astounding to read people's takes that are authoritatively claiming that LLMs are not useful for software development. It's like telling me over the phone that restaurant X doesn't have a pasta dish, while I'm sitting at restaurant X eating a pasta dish. It's just weird, but I understand that maybe you haven't gone to the resto in a while, or didn't see the menu item, or maybe you just have something against this restaurant for some weird reason.

Example stuff that helps:

  - extensive test suites
  - making LLMs use YAML for data-intensive files, instead of writing inline
  - putting a lot of structural guard rails using type-systems, parse-dont-verify, ...
  - having well scoped tasks
  - giving the LLM tight self-serve feedback loops

I think the glut is ZIRP, but the lack of recovery (or very slow pickup) is AI.

I wagger the same for AI agent techniques.