This is interesting given Googlebooks actually use the same boot process as Chromebooks, they just chain into aboot.

Secure boot is not attestation. It does not provide userspace any guarantee the system booted a secure boot chain.

Secure boot can be bypassed by dodgy firmware (cough cough msi) or the kernel can lie to userspace about the secure boot state.

The moment the UEFI firmware jumps to the bootloader, secure boot is no longer useful.

> Look, if Canonical had one of their keys leaked, I can go and sign my kernel and kernel modules and secure boot just fine as if my kernel is one distributed by Canonical. There are no checks on whether the contents of the kernel are correct

This is literally where the TPM comes into play because your kernels signature would get written to the PCR register and fail an attestation check.

> This is about control over the ecosystem, an ecosystem Epic has spent their years spitting in the face of.

This is just FUD

Desktop Linux has none of that.

Because your kernel could have the ability to allow a program to modify the game memory and hide the fact it's doing so?

Most Linux users are probably using a signed kernel. I don't think this is as big of a deal as you're making out.

Namely by going too far and breaking the law by becoming discriminatory? So now companies are not going to touch DEI.

DEI killed DEI, not Trump.

These aren't illegal and have never been the problem.

Discriminational hiring practices and quotas are, unfortunately DEI activists decided to do these.

Such should rightfully be illegal.

So legally at one point a Linux was Unix.

WoW goes to lengths to hide its depth buffer.

Instead Qualcomm should improve their ACPI implementation and improve the kernels handling of it

It's more accurate than getting it from a NTP pool.