any examples of women warlords ? I'm interested because both gendering and not gendering that sentence would upset feminists and I can't tell if this is trolling or whether more thought went into why gendering felt like the safe bet here.

IMO study whatever you like, no? For me being deeply immersed in a topic that doesn't 1:1 translate to an improvement on the CV is its own pleasure. This way I get to read (complex stuff) for pleasure because it isn't connected to the career hamster-wheel. There is no pressure, while at the same time directly improving my foundation - whether that is Philosophy, pure Math or niche-History does it matter?

> better off focusing on what's actually in the modern world.

this might change your mind: https://www.suhrkamp.de/rights/book/andreas-reckwitz-loss-fr... (If you only want to study what's actually happening in the modern world, this is the one that explains the loss from Modernity through a sociological lense)

I recall N.N. Taleb also making some good points about why to read books that have stood the test of time rather than a best-seller.

fwiw, the pre-print reads:

   To define committed collapse, i.e. that past and unavoidable future emissions have already locked in collapse, we assume that global emissions cannot be mitigated from peak to net-zero any faster than 35 years.

    The ‘2025 peak ensemble’ therefore quantifies the probability that AMOC collapse is already committed, i.e. past emission have already locked in the collapse by 2025;

aren't they like some kind of non-profit (in the legal sense) that is still able to take a lot of money (from players like Google and Co, to justify fixing this), as opposed to ... say the Zig foundation, ... that is is also "non-profit" but can't get money the same way?

a link to the PR or Changelog would strengthen this comment that it actually happened?

for example in my org it is part of the culture that security has no seat at the table. that is a separate problem, but the number of orgs like mine are more numerous than the number of orgs where security isn't a cost-center.

we find lots of stuff because low-hanging fruit is everywhere. hecking heck: I'm a fruit.

and when the cost of fixing is even the slightest inconvenience to devs we will not fix it, but continue sitting on the risk until the cows come home. In such a place a new critical finding isn't even novel. Instead our job moves to to combining different vulns that we already have, and try to show managers how bad it is.

the common retort from management is: proof to me why this is an issue, and why engineering should divert their attention to it. And unless my team can proof why X can be exploited, or Y can be bypassed, or Z can gain persistence, ... the vulnerabilities will remain. I have been in discussions where the business demanded to see an exploit so they can justify the cost of fixing it. low-cyber-maturity doesn't even describe it. we are not a mom and pop shop but have 110K employees worldwide. and again - we are not uniquely insecure.

so these guardrails aren't helping because the moment the chat has any offsec artifacts, or even just a single wrongly worded phrase anywhere in the workspace, the session is flagged, you need to downgrade the model.

what adds insult to injury, is that the guardrail is just a way to funnel users into the Ai company's "cyber marketing" program: "your chat has been flagged, please proof your identity and hand over your passport data so you can sign up to our TrustedCyber program". Bitch please you have my payment information, use that??

if you consider bug-density (security defect density) per LoC, it is even more of a sh1t show: no restrictions apply for developers to push their buggy code, but the security team needs to somehow proof that they aren't the malicious party?

totally off - considering the right way to build defensive/offsec/malicious tooling with AI isn't by using frontier models ... but run a serious of agents on tightly scoped tasks. see https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2026/03/25/ai-bug-f... and https://aisle.com/blog/ai-cybersecurity-after-mythos-the-jag... - this shuts out the average joe who works in an org where cyber security maturity is poor. joe does not know about how to orchestrate a fleet of agents and give them muppet names. all he knows is that the good guys are losing the fight.

speed (over tor) is not a concern either when much of it is served from the cache. alec muffet has the right ideas. but you might want to study his threat-model before copy pasting.

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