<rss version="2.0" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Hacker News: GeorgeKangas</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/user?id=GeorgeKangas</link><description>Hacker News RSS</description><docs>https://hnrss.org/</docs><generator>hnrss v2.1.1</generator><lastBuildDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 01:44:34 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hnrss.org/user?id=GeorgeKangas" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "Creatine raises brain energy levels and slows cognitive decline: study"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>> Without a placebo group...<p>You just needed to read the next paragraph:<p>"The 2026 multicenter placebo-controlled trial extending this work..."</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2026 21:42:04 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48350035</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48350035</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48350035</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "A Surprising Side of Carl Sagan"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>That part of the book (<i>Contact</i>) really bugged me.<p>The definition of pi is what determines the digits of pi, FULL STOP.  There's no room whatsoever, for any sort of agent to 'leave a message' in those digits.  I would think even a full-on theist would be embarrassed to suggest otherwise.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 08 Jul 2022 22:55:01 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32028810</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32028810</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32028810</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "Two envelopes problem"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Why is no one looking at <i>the chance-giver</i>, and considering <i>his</i> motive?  One would reasonably assume he'd like to minimize the payout -- so he'd offer you the chance to switch <i>only if</i> you had chosen the richer envelope.  The description explicitly allows this possibility:<p>"<i>Having chosen</i>... you are given the chance to switch"<p>Nowhere does it say, you'll be offered the switch <i>no matter which</i> envelope you choose.<p>Same idea applies, to the very similar Monty Hall problem.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2022 17:24:32 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31572244</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31572244</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31572244</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Recognizing one's subjective experience (SE), entails knowing <i>for certain</i> that it exists.<p>That true statement is definitely <i>not</i> an argument in favor SE; it would be of no evidentiary value to a zombie, for example.<p>If and when you, naasking, have SE <i>and</i> recognize it: it's existence will then be <i>impossible</i> to doubt.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 04 Feb 2022 23:04:46 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30214731</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30214731</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30214731</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Dennett's position makes perfect sense -- <i>if</i> Dennett is a zombie.  For a zombie, to whom subjective experience (SE) is not even a thing, the "hard problem" can only mean: why do people <i>talk about</i> SE?  So that's what they set about explaining.<p>However, I don't think Dennett (or any human) is actually a zombie.  The difficulty, is getting people to <i>recognize</i> their own SE.  Our vocabulary, all about material and mechanisms, can't actually define SE.  Instead, we have a few <i>ostensions</i> by which an attentive experiencer <i>might</i> recognize his own SE:<p>[Descartes] SE is that <i>one</i> thing, which <i>absolutely must</i> exist.<p>[Nagel] SE is "what it's like, to be...".
He adds, that all our science is fully consistent with SE not existing.  That's why it makes perfect sense <i>for a zombie</i> to believe it doesn't exist.<p>[Jackson]: Mary knows what seeing red is like, <i>only</i> when she has seen red.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 04 Feb 2022 22:47:04 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30214515</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30214515</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30214515</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Very well then: <i>you</i> either don't have SE, or don't recognize your own SE.  My guess is the latter.<p>I don't think SE is exclusive to humans, but only humans <i>talk</i> about it, as far as we know.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 04 Feb 2022 22:18:59 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30214149</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30214149</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30214149</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>If you start with material mechanisms, you'll never get subjective experience (SE) as a conclusion.<p>Start instead with SE, and then <i>any</i> sort of material universe can be the contents of it.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 04 Feb 2022 20:50:18 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30212985</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30212985</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30212985</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>If one is a "phenomenological zombie", i.e. does not have subjective experience (SE), then Dennett's position is the only one that makes any sense.  The only thing to explain, is why <i>others</i> are believing this SE illusion.<p>Those of us who <i>do</i> have SE, and have recognized it, know something the zombies <i>cannot</i> know: that SE <i>must</i> exist.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 04 Feb 2022 20:38:27 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30212795</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30212795</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30212795</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>"you don't have conscious experience, you only think you do."<p>That's what <i>illusionism</i>, the position of Keith Frankish, asserts.  Dennett mostly seems to support it, as you note, but more equivocally than Frankish.<p>For those of us who have subjective experience (SE), and are aware of it: SE is <i>the</i> thing, which we know <i>must</i> exist (as noted by Descartes).<p>Anyone doubting the existence of SE, either is not having SE (i.e. is a "phenomenological zombie"), or (more likely, IMO) has not identified his own SE.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 04 Feb 2022 20:20:43 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30212497</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30212497</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30212497</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "Emergence of Life in an Inflationary Universe (2020)"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>One somewhat incremental approach, is called a hypercycle: several simple self replicators "form an alliance" wherein they promote <i>each other's</i> self replication.<p>Not specific to RNA.<p>And I'm not a biologist.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Mon, 24 Jan 2022 01:11:18 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30052461</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30052461</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30052461</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "Emergence of Life in an Inflationary Universe (2020)"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>I can see two ways around the low probability problem, for RNA abiogenesis:<p>1) The crystal gene hypothesis of A. G. Cairns-Smith.  As a clay crystal grows and splits, the info in the crystal's defect structure is replicating with impressive fidelity, and those defects also interact with the surroundings.  So you get the Darwinian game bootstrapped pretty much for free.  Later on, the crystals start using organic polymers; later still, the polymer technology is developed well enough to take over from the clay.  So this might make abiogenesis reasonably probable on one planet.<p>2) An observable universe is just any epsilon size patch, on an inflationary universe.  The space-time curvature of our whole observable universe is too small to measure, hence the radius of our inflationary universe is a large multiple of the 13 G-lightyear radius we can observe.  So abiogenesis could be highly improbable in any observable universe, answering Fermi's paradox, yet be probable within the much greater volume of an inflationary universe (maybe this is what TFA said? TLDR [Edit: yeah, it says that right in the abstract]).  And there could even be a large number of inflationary universes, for all we know.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Sun, 23 Jan 2022 18:21:59 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30048736</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30048736</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30048736</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "A quick note on airships (2020)"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>I read (I forget where) that the Hindenburg's <i>skin</i> is where it started burning.  The skin was fabric, painted with flammable shellac, and the shellac contained a lot of aluminum powder.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Tue, 05 Oct 2021 17:13:06 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28762327</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28762327</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28762327</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "Thomas Nagel: Thoughts Are Real (2013)"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Thanks for replying, skohan!  Since this item has moved far off the front page, I'm guessing that just about nobody else will be seeing whatever else we write here.  If you wish, you can email me at gwkangas@ku.edu .<p>Descartes described the clearest identifying property of SE: it's <i>absolutely</i> certain to exist.  Since absolute certainty lies outside the scope of science: science can't define what SE <i>is</i>, it can only describe what SE <i>does</i>.<p>Science doesn't rule out the philosophical hypothesis known as "illusionism" (advocated by Keith Frankish), that SE is a delusion.<p>If you, skohan, have SE and have correctly identified it: its nonexistence will be inconceivable to you.  Are you there yet?</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Sep 2021 20:21:36 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28437622</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28437622</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28437622</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "Thomas Nagel: Thoughts Are Real (2013)"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>> ...the need some people seem to have to reach for an extra-physical domain for the mind to exist in.<p>It's because subjective experience (SE) cannot even be <i>defined</i> in physical terms.  Or any terms, really.
Instead of any <i>definition</i> of SE, all that's on offer are <i>ostensions</i> that will direct a reader's attention to his own SE <i>if he's having it</i>.  Such as:<p>Descartes: SE is what you're absolutely certain <i>must exist</i>, even if everything else is an illusion.<p>Nagel: SE is "what it's like to be _____".<p>Nagel again (same paper, but not quoted enough):
It [SE] is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are <i>logically compatible with its absence</i>. [italics mine]</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Sep 2021 21:51:20 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28428162</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28428162</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28428162</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "The Complexity of a WW II P-47 Thunderbolt’s Powerplant (2015)"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>The word "turbocharger" was introduced to shorten the phrase "turbine supercharger", whether driven by the crankshaft or by the exhaust.  Later, it came to mean "exhaust driven turbine supercharger" pretty much exclusively.<p>I don't have any dates for these usages.<p>Edit: that p-47 powertrain is an absolute beast!</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Sat, 20 Mar 2021 21:33:28 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26526218</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26526218</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26526218</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "Cyclone Scheme: A R7RS Scheme Compiler"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>I believe Chicken & Cyclone both:<p><pre><code>  ..transpile to C for speed,
  ..have an interpreter (REPL) for convenience,
  ..use *Cheney on the MTA* to support:
  ....continuations
  ....1st generation of GC.
</code></pre>
If I'm wrong, thx in advance for corrrection.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Tue, 12 Jan 2021 20:09:07 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25752748</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25752748</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25752748</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "Linux on an 8-Bit Micro? (2012)"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>The 6809 was 8 bits, in the same way Z80 and 6502 and 6800 were: 8 bit data bus, 16 bit address bus.<p>It had a few 16 bit instructions: arithmetic on data in registers, or loading/storing a 16 bit register (8 bits at a time).  I think the Z80 did as well.<p>Here's Wikipedia: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motorola_6809" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motorola_6809</a></p>
]]></description><pubDate>Sat, 27 Apr 2019 06:25:29 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19764125</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19764125</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19764125</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "Linux on an 8-Bit Micro? (2012)"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>I had an 8-bit micro, the Tandy (i.e. Radio Shack) Color Computer ("CoCo"), made in the mid 80s.<p>I got an optional OS for it, called "OS9" but unrelated to Apple's OS9 (which came later).<p>OS9 had capabilities very similar to (and modeled on)Unix.  Clearly, Linux or something a lot like it could also have run on the CoCo.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Sat, 27 Apr 2019 02:55:08 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19763470</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19763470</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19763470</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "T * sin (t) ≈ Christmas tree"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Suggestion: to make the tree self-similar at the vertex point, use [x, y] = t * [cos, sin] ( k * ln(t) ).  The constant k determines the tightness of the spiral winding.<p>Another way to describe it: the spiral's uphill slope stays constant.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Wed, 26 Dec 2018 03:44:12 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18760354</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18760354</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18760354</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by GeorgeKangas in "An Italian Song That Sounds Like English But Is Nonsense"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>For me, most singing "Sounds Like English But Is Nonsense".  So if I had watched this Italian guy's video, without being <i>told</i> it was nonsense... I wouldn't have made out a single word, but I wouldn't have known there actually wasn't a single word to make out.<p>Some singing is enunciated enough, that I actually do hear all the words.  Notably, the Beatles.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Sat, 27 Jan 2018 20:17:10 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16247885</link><dc:creator>GeorgeKangas</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16247885</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16247885</guid></item></channel></rss>