What sad place do you come from?

The article contains only a vague half paragraph of architecture:

  > they want to move the permission management from Flatpak into the service layer, through a new service called systemd-appd. Systemd-appd gives applications an identifier and stores their permissions, and then this data can be queried by the rest of the system. In turn, this enables a slew of other features, not least of which is subsandboxing. 

And what other speculated Flatpak features introduce other dependencies from systemd? Discussing whether unwanted dependencies can be made optional or eliminated requires technical details.

  volatile int x = 5;
  ...
  int y=x;
  printf("%d in hex is 0x%x.\n", y, y);

First of all, traffic rules are good, and similar to good C programming rules: check number value ranges when there is a chance of casting or overflow, check Inf and NaN floating point values, declare alignment strategically (e.g. in all memory allocations) to avoid misaligned pointers and variables, and so on. Such rules have alternatives and exceptions and must not be part of the language.

Second, nobody needs perfection and "UB-freeness": it is reasonable to assume that many cases of UB won't be a problem, either because a library will be used correctly and they won't happen, or because the C implementation is neither weird nor hostile and they will be as benign as defined or implementation defined behaviour, or simply because we avoid doing something known to be inexact or hard to write correctly.

Practical programming requires knowing the relevant rules for what one is doing and learning new ones by making, diagnosing and overcoming mistakes; not omniscience, and definitely not the unfounded feeling of omniscience and unlimited resources that LLMs can give.

EDIT: I insist on the signed char example because it would be terribly wrong (processing who-knows-what as if it were a sequence of characters) even without undefined behaviour, even in different languages.

For example, you seem to underestimate how wrong placing negative values in a signed char is: ordinary character encodings do not use negative codes, so either those negative values are not characters and they have no business being treated as such, or something strange and experimental is going on.

  - Creating a potentially troublesome misaligned int pointer is a precisely localized and completely explicit user mistake, not something that just happens because it's C.
  - Passing signed char to character classification functions that expect an unsigned char (disguised as an int) is a very specific dumb user error. The C standard could specify that all negative inputs, including EOF and invalid signed char values, are classified as not belonging to the character class, but I doubt the current undefined behaviour in isxdigit() etc. implementations ever went beyond accepting invalid inputs.
  - Casting floating point values to integer values in general requires taking care of whether the FP values are small enough to be represented and what to do with NaN and Inf values: not the language's responsibility. C offers a toolbox of tests, not ready-made application specific error handling.
  - Expecting C to handle "address zero" in physical memory in ways that conflict with NULL in source code denotes a complete lack of understanding of what a program is. Where stuff in an executable is loaded in memory, in the rare cases when it matters, can surely be affected with platform specific extensions, possibly at the level of linker commands with nothing appearing in the C source code.

For example Swift enums, while in some ways clunky, can do a decent job both as newtypes and as sum types (unlike Java enums, which are a fixed collection of instances of the same class).

Then slow down.

With this objective lack or control, sooner or later your LLM experiments in production will drive into a wall instead of hitting a little pothole like this diagram.

I think what NSA is likely to keep confidential are in-house plugins that are so specialized and/or underengineered that their publication would give away confidential information: stolen and illegitimate secrets (e.g. cryptographic private keys from a game console SDK), or exploits that they intend to deny knowledge of and continue milking, or general strategies and methods (e.g. a tool to "customize" UEFI images, with the implication that they have means to install them on a victim's computer).