GrapheneOS is a privacy project first, does not come bundled with any google services, and only makes connections to 1st party services by default. /e/OS includes many google services with privileged OS integration. GrapheneOS is far more effective at the goal you state /e/OS has than /e/OS.

Murena does not provide private or secure products and has positioned itself to be against what GrapheneOS provides. A partnership with a company opposed to GrapheneOS and spreading misinformation about it would not be beneficial, and it is not petty to make the smart choice for the benefit of privacy and security.

For GOS to consider it, it would likely need to be backed by the secure element.

Duress PIN is deemed acceptable to implement in the OS because it is expected that the user is the one to enter it, so it has not fallen into the hands of attackers who may bypass it. Once attackers have it, you are effectively gambling. Account for that in your threat model and do not let it get to that point.

Motorola is currently porting GrapheneOS to their devices.

The duress wipe feature shuts the device down to let RAM discharge, this is an important step to remove any components of decryption before they can be lifted.

GrapheneOS only supports devices that meet the baseline hardware security requirements. Pixels arent "poisoned" and there is no evidence to suggest any hardware backdoors exist, and quite a lot of evidence to show they dont exist.

All of those apps support using google services FCM for push notification delivery. I dont think Telegram has a fallback, and Signal and Whatsapp have power-intensive fallbacks. You may also need to reinstall these apps for them to detect google services (apps generally dont check for google services more than once on initial launch).

Like... this is how the entire underground railroad and many other examples worked out.

GrapheneOS is not for criminals, its not aimed at criminals, its not designed for criminals. Not implicitly or explicitly.

Thats like saying the right to remain silent interferes with law enforcement doing their jobs. Law enforcement has one job, enforcing the law, and that includes following their own laws. People have a right to privacy, and GrapheneOS is one of the many methods that allow people to exercise that right.

Using desktop linux phones and trying to force that as a norm would set privacy and security back substantially.

The inverse of what you suggest, which is Android with desktop linux app compatibility, would be a huge step forward, and is already much closer than you might think.

Modern phones have substantially better VM support in the hardware than in previous models, and it is maturing at a very fast rate. We would be able to run linux VMs on Android, paired with desktop mode, with evidence for USB passthrough for an externel GPU in AOSP

There is also evidence that we will be able to put desktop linux app icons on the Android homescreen and using them in an app-like fashion.

This would use the more secure host to run the VM for the less secure OS.

To be clear, I am NOT advising root access. I am not contradicting myself. I am telling you it is dangerous but still telling you how it can be done in a less terrible way. To withhold that info would be senseless gatekeeping. GrapheneOS supports being built as a userdebug image but that will not stop them from telling you how bad an idea it is to use it on a production device.

GrapheneOS will not be rolling back aspects of the security model. That would be a massive step backwards for privacy and security.

So no, they are not "only met on a single line of devices", in fact Samsung gets super close, but they remove yellowboot support and cripple the device if you unlock the bootloader.