Comments URL: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46539835

Points: 2

# Comments: 1

You can fill out the questionnaire here: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14608-European-Research-Area-Act/public-consultation_en

Academic institutions, NGOs, EU- and non-EU citizens, and businesses can all respond.

You can look at the submissions to get an idea of the concerns raised [2]

[1]: "Barriers also remain to the free and open access to publicly funded R&I results" mentioned in the call for evidence https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14608-European-Research-Area-Act_en

[2]: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14608-European-Research-Area-Act/F3719029_en

Comments URL: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46497387

Points: 10

# Comments: 0

Not sure in what world Merz's coalition could ever be considered centre-left. It's a coalition of the conservative party (which moved much further right under his leadership) and the centrist Social Democrats (who equally moved to the right/center under current and former leadership). Calling them "centre-right" could perhaps be acceptable, all while "conservative" is also a widespread label.

I know this is not the point of the article but why would you take a flight from Geneva to Zurich? It's less than 3h by train, which if you count the time it takes to get to Geneva airport and go through security, probably becomes a much smaller difference.

And for that, you're emitting ~100kg of CO2 [1]

[1]: https://curb6.com/footprint/flights/geneva-gva/zurich-zrh

Unlike what other commentators imply, this judgment doesn't legitimize just inventing degrees or qualifications. It's closer to omitting that 2-month job that didn't work out

Speaking of "armchair international law experts", this is completely wrong.

BLUF: Failing to distinguish does not deprive you of fundamental guarantees of humane treatment, including the prohibition of torture and summary execution - both of which are war crimes.

The individual obligation to distinguish is linked to Prisoner of War (POW) status - those who do not distinguish, do not get the protections of that status. That is the only consequence of the failure to distinguish. All those persons who are not POWs are automatically civilians, as made clear by the residual clause in Article 4(4) Fourth Geneva Convention (GC IV). While civilians can be interned for "imperative reasons of security", they are entitled to their own detailed treatment obligations (Articles 79-135 GC IV). In any case, even if they are somehow not entitled to that treatment, the fundamental humane treatment guarantees of Art 27 GC IV [1] and Art 75 Additional Protocol I [2] (which, as customary law, applies to all parties to a conflict) nonetheless apply. If we argue that it is a non-international armed conflict (which knows neither POW status nor the obligation to distinguish), Common Article 3 [3] similarly obligates humane treatment. Humane treatment is also a norm under customary law [4].

Under these rules, you cannot torture people and you cannot summarily execute people [4]. Read the provisions yourself. In fact, summary execution and torture are actual war crimes [5]. If you want to punish a person, you need to give them a fair trial (IHL does not prohibit the death penalty).

You seem to be hinting at the Bush-era "illegal enemy combatant" theory but even the Bush Admin never argued that those persons are not entitled to humane treatment (it was mostly about fair trial rights), and the US (as its lone defender) has long since abandoned the position.

Whether Hamas is actually subject to such an obligation to distinguish is highly controversial. On one level is the issue of conflict classification, since POW status and the obligation to distinguish only exist in the law of international armed conflict (IAC). If we accept that there is an IAC (e.g. because of the military occupation), then the question still arises if Hamas somehow "belongs" to the State of Palestine or if they should just be seen as civilians directly participating in hostilities or as being in a parallel non-international armed conflict between Hamas and Israel. In turn, if we accept that there is an obligation to distinguish applicable to Hamas, then Israel also needs to treat Hamas fighters that distinguished as POWs (and, as set out above, if they failed to distinguish, as civilians).

[1]: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/art...

[2]: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/arti...

[3]: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/art...

[4]: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule87 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule89 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule90

[5]: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule156

Of course, the document itself would not make a statement on its authoritative nature since, despite the broad consultation with experts, they cannot predict the wider reaction.

And that should be emphasized: the Geneva Conventions allow the targeting of military objectives, combatants (i.e. members of armed forces) and "civilians directly participating in hostilities". The Guidance just interprets the latter and arguably widens the scope, because - without the invention of "continuous combatant function" - you could attack e.g. members of Hamas' armed wing during an attack and in preparation of one. Now you can attack them at any time.

For a source, you can check out the Red Cross document I linked. Specifically, Ctrl+F for "continuous combat function" and read the commentary on recommendation V. The Guidance is considered authoritative in legal circles.

IHL actually prohibits the killing of persons who are not combatants or "fighters" of an armed group. Only those who have the "continuous function" to "directly participate in hostilities"[1] may be targeted for attack at any time. Everyone else is a civilian that can only be directly targeted when and for as long as they directly participate in hostilities, such as by taking up arms, planning military operations, laying down mines, etc.

That is, only members of the armed wing of Hamas (not recruiters, weapon manufacturers, propagandists, financiers, …) can be targeted for attack - all the others must be arrested and/or tried. Otherwise, the allowed list of targets of civilians gets so wide than in any regular war, pretty much any civilian could get targeted, such as the bank employee whose company has provided loans to the armed forces.

Lavender is so scary because it enables Israel's mass targeting of people who are protected against attack by international law, providing a flimsy (political but not legal) justification for their association with terrorists.

[1]: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990...

Comments URL: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39465309

Points: 2

# Comments: 0

> (γ) Statutory requirement to decrypt communications

> 76. Lastly, as regards the requirement to submit to the security services information necessary to decrypt electronic communications if they are encrypted, the Court observes that international bodies have argued that encryption provides strong technical safeguards against unlawful access to the content of communications and has therefore been widely used as a means of protecting the right to respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence online. In the digital age, technical solutions for securing and protecting the privacy of electronic communications, including measures for encryption, contribute to ensuring the enjoyment of other fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression (see paragraphs 28 and 34 above). Encryption, moreover, appears to help citizens and businesses to defend themselves against abuses of information technologies, such as hacking, identity and personal data theft, fraud and the improper disclosure of confidential information. This should be given due consideration when assessing measures which may weaken encryption.

> 77. As noted above (see paragraph 57 above), it appears that in order to enable decryption of communications protected by end-to-end encryption, such as communications through Telegram’s “secret chats”, it would be necessary to weaken encryption for all users. These measures allegedly cannot be limited to specific individuals and would affect everyone indiscriminately, including individuals who pose no threat to a legitimate government interest. Weakening encryption by creating backdoors would apparently make it technically possible to perform routine, general and indiscriminate surveillance of personal electronic communications. Backdoors may also be exploited by criminal networks and would seriously compromise the security of all users’ electronic communications. The Court takes note of the dangers of restricting encryption described by many experts in the field (see, in particular, paragraphs 28 and 34 above).

> 78. The Court accepts that encryption can also be used by criminals, which may complicate criminal investigations (see Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, § 312, 26 September 2023). However, it takes note in this connection of the calls for alternative “solutions to decryption without weakening the protective mechanisms, both in legislation and through continuous technical evolution” (see, on the possibilities of alternative methods of investigation, the Joint Statement by Europol and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, cited in paragraph 33 above, and paragraph 24 of the Report on the right to privacy in the digital age by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, cited in paragraph 28 above; see also the explanation by third-party interveners in paragraph 47 above).

> 79. The Court concludes that in the present case the ICO’s statutory obligation to decrypt end-to-end encrypted communications risks amounting to a requirement that providers of such services weaken the encryption mechanism for all users; it is accordingly not proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.

> (δ) Conclusion

> 80. The Court concludes from the foregoing that the contested legislation providing for the retention of all Internet communications of all users, the security services’ direct access to the data stored without adequate safeguards against abuse and the requirement to decrypt encrypted communications, as applied to end-to-end encrypted communications, cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society. In so far as this legislation permits the public authorities to have access, on a generalised basis and without sufficient safeguards, to the content of electronic communications, it impairs the very essence of the right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention. The respondent State has therefore overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation in this regard.

> 81. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

That also becomes clear in the key paragraph 80: "The Court concludes from the foregoing that the contested legislation providing for the retention of all Internet communications of all users, the security services’ direct access to the data stored _without adequate safeguards against abuse_ and the _requirement to decrypt encrypted communications_, as applied to end-to-end encrypted communications, cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society"

The Court does not qualify the requirement to decrypt E2EE communications with the same safeguards requirements. That of course does not exclude the possibility of the Court finding that a more narrowly-construed law is not in violation. But the Court clearly signals its skepticism towards any "requirement that providers of such services weaken the encryption mechanism for all users" (para 79).

Regarding (2), the Court found that a statutory obligation to decrypt E2E-encrypted data upon (judicial) request to be disproportionate, but it could still be imagined that – if more narrowly construed – a law could be considered to be proportionate. But the Court does seem quite unwilling to entertain the idea of backdoors for E2E encryption.

Regarding (1), the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) allows so-called derogations from certain rights in "time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation" (Art 15 ECHR), insofar as they are necessary and the state of emergency has been properly declared. The right to privacy is such a right, so a State that faces an insurgency may declare a state of emergency and, as part of its emergency measures, could probably demand the decryption of E2E communications if it's necessary to fight the insurgency (e.g. it's a guerilla group using an E2E messenger) - but hard to judge in the abstract.