<rss version="2.0" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Hacker News: Strilanc</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/user?id=Strilanc</link><description>Hacker News RSS</description><docs>https://hnrss.org/</docs><generator>hnrss v2.1.1</generator><lastBuildDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 08:05:34 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hnrss.org/user?id=Strilanc" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "A cryptography engineer's perspective on quantum computing timelines"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>> <i>That graph suggests that even with the best error correction in the graph, it is impossible to factor RSA-4 with less then 10^4 qubits. Which seems very odd.</i><p>It's because the plot is assuming the use of error correction even for the smallest cases. Error correction has minimum quantity and quality bars that you must clear in order for it to work at all, and most of the cost of breaking RSA4 is just clearing those bars. (You happen to be able to do RSA4 without error correction, as was done in 2001 [0], but it's kind of irrelevant because you need error correction to scale so results without it are on the wrong trendline. That's even more true for the annealing stuff Scott mentioned, which has absolutely no chance of scaling.)<p>You say you don't see the uranium piling up. Okay. Consider the historically reported lifetimes of classical bits stored using repetition codes on the UCSB->Google machines [1]. In 2014 the stored bit lived less than a second. In 2015 it lived less than a second. 2016? Less than a second. 2017? 2018? 2019? 2020? 2021? 2022? Yeah, less than a second. And this may not surprise you but yes, in 2023, it also lived less than a second. Then, in 2024... kaboom! It's living for hours [4].<p>You don't see the decreasing gate error rates [2]? The increasing capabilities [3]? The ever larger error correcting code demonstrations [4]? The front-loaded costs and exponential returns inherent to fault tolerance? TFA is absolutely correct: the time to start transitioning to PQC is now.<p>[0]: <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/414883a" rel="nofollow">https://www.nature.com/articles/414883a</a><p>[1]: <a href="https://algassert.com/assets/2025-12-24-qec-foom/plot-half-life-linear.png" rel="nofollow">https://algassert.com/assets/2025-12-24-qec-foom/plot-half-l...</a> (from <a href="https://algassert.com/post/2503" rel="nofollow">https://algassert.com/post/2503</a> )<p>[2]: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.17286" rel="nofollow">https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.17286</a><p>[3]: <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-025-09596-6" rel="nofollow">https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-025-09596-6</a><p>[4]: <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-024-08449-y" rel="nofollow">https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-024-08449-y</a></p>
]]></description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 00:25:36 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47669172</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47669172</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47669172</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "Quantum computing bombshells that are not April Fools"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>The newest transaction mechanism (taproot; P2TR) exposes the public key of the receiver as part of the transaction. If it becomes more commonly used, the supply of bitcoins with exposed public keys would start going up again. See figure 5 of <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.28846#page=14" rel="nofollow">https://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.28846#page=14</a> .</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 17:56:31 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47617839</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47617839</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47617839</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "Quantum computing bombshells that are not April Fools"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>The DoS attack in this scenario is someone just submitting reasonable-looking but ultimately bad precommitments as fast as possible. The intuition is that precommitments must be hard to validate because, if there was an easy validation mechanism, you would have just used that mechanism as the transaction mechanism. And so all these junk random precommitments look potentially legitimate and end up being <i>stored for later verification</i>. So all you have to do to take down the system is fill up the available storage with junk, which (given the size of bot networks and the cost of storing something for a day) seems very doable.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 17:45:05 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47617671</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47617671</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47617671</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "Quantum computing bombshells that are not April Fools"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Yes, that would be a concern. You could require a proof of work to submit a precommitment, so that DoSing was at least expensive to do. You could have some sort of deposit mechanism, where a precommitment would lock down 0.1 bitcoins (from a quantum-secure wallet) until the precommitment was used. I admit I'm glad I don't have to figure out those details.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 17:38:36 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47617559</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47617559</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47617559</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "Quantum computing bombshells that are not April Fools"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Caution: that 10M estimate assumes gate error rates 10x lower than the ones assumed in the papers from TFA.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 16:40:03 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47616778</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47616778</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47616778</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "Quantum computing bombshells that are not April Fools"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>You are assuming that progress on factoring will be smooth, but this is unlikely to be true. The scaling challenges of quantum computers are very front-loaded. I know this sounds crazy, but there is a sense in which the step from 15 to 21 is larger than the step from 21 to 1522605027922533360535618378132637429718068114961380688657908494580122963258952897654000350692006139 (the RSA100 challenge number).<p>Consider the neutral atom proposal from TFA. They say they need tens of thousands of qubits to attack 256 bit keys. Existing machines have demonstrated six thousand atom qubits [1]. Since the size is ~halfway there, why haven't the existing machines broken 128 bit keys yet? Basically: because they need to improve gate fidelity and do system integration to combine together various pieces that have so far only been demonstrated separately and solve some other problems. These dense block codes have minimum sizes and minimum qubit qualities you must satisfy in order for the code to function. In that kind of situation, gradual improvement can take you surprisingly suddenly from "the dense code isn't working yet so I can't factor 21" to "the dense code is working great now, so I can factor RSA100". Probably things won't play out quite like that... but if your job is to be prepared for quantum attacks then you really need to worry about those kinds of scenarios.<p>[1]: <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-025-09641-4" rel="nofollow">https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-025-09641-4</a></p>
]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 05:35:46 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47610351</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47610351</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47610351</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "Quantum computing bombshells that are not April Fools"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>This is for rescue, not for payment. Once you've moved the coins to quantum-secure wallet, the delay would no longer be needed.<p>...probably some people would be very inconvenienced by this. But not as inconvenienced as having the coins stolen or declared forever inaccessible.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 04:51:42 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47610119</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47610119</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47610119</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "Quantum computing bombshells that are not April Fools"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>The best proposal I have heard for rescuing P2SH wallets after cryptographically relevant quantum computers exist is to require vulnerable wallets to precommit to transactions a day ahead of time. The precommitment doesn't reveal the public key. When the public key must be exposed as part of the actual transaction, an attacker cannot redirect the transaction for at least one day because they don't have a valid precommitment to point to yet.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 04:01:01 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47609842</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47609842</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47609842</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[Quantum computing bombshells that are not April Fools]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Article URL: <a href="https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=9665">https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=9665</a></p>
<p>Comments URL: <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47608495">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47608495</a></p>
<p>Points: 265</p>
<p># Comments: 107</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 00:24:43 +0000</pubDate><link>https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=9665</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47608495</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47608495</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "Securing Elliptic Curve Cryptocurrencies Against Quantum Vulnerabilities [pdf]"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p><i>> [0.1% gate error rate] is still wildly out of reach</i><p>This is false. When Fowler et al assumed 0.1% gate error rates would be reached for his estimates in 2012 [0], that was ostentatious. Now it's frankly a bit overly conservative. All the big architectures are approaching or surpassing 0.1% gate error rates.<p>From 2022 to 2024, the google team improved mean two qubit gate error rate from 0.6% [1] to 0.4% [2]. Quantinuum's Helios has a two qubit gate error rate of 0.08% [3]. IBM has Heron processors available on their cloud service with two qubit gate error rates ranging from 0.2% to 0.7% [4]. Neutral atom machines have demonstrated 0.5% gate error rates [5].<p>[0]: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1208.0928" rel="nofollow">https://arxiv.org/abs/1208.0928</a><p>[1]: fig 1c of <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/2207.06431" rel="nofollow">https://arxiv.org/pdf/2207.06431</a><p>[2]: fig 1b of <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.13687" rel="nofollow">https://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.13687</a><p>[3]: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.05465" rel="nofollow">https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.05465</a><p>[4]: <a href="https://quantum.cloud.ibm.com/computers?processorType=Heron" rel="nofollow">https://quantum.cloud.ibm.com/computers?processorType=Heron</a> (numbers may vary as the website is not static)<p>[5]: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.05420" rel="nofollow">https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.05420</a></p>
]]></description><pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 16:31:47 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47603106</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47603106</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47603106</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "The “JVG algorithm” only wins on tiny numbers"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Minor update: Dominik condensed the blog posts into a pre-print: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.09901" rel="nofollow">https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.09901</a></p>
]]></description><pubDate>Wed, 11 Mar 2026 18:08:03 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47339058</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47339058</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47339058</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "The “JVG algorithm” only wins on tiny numbers"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>That slide deck is complaining that correct work on quantum attacks should be seen as negligible priority or as distractions. TFA is complaining that JVG isn't even <i>correct</i>. They are pretty different concerns.<p>To be clear, I think that slide deck will be looked back upon as naive. In particular, it makes the classic mistake of assuming the size of number factored should be growing smoothly. That's naive because 15 is such a huge cost outlier and because quantum error correction has frontloaded costs. See [1] and [2] for details.<p>[1]: <a href="https://algassert.com/post/2500" rel="nofollow">https://algassert.com/post/2500</a><p>[2]: <a href="https://algassert.com/post/2503" rel="nofollow">https://algassert.com/post/2503</a></p>
]]></description><pubDate>Wed, 11 Mar 2026 15:36:15 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47336993</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47336993</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47336993</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "The “JVG algorithm” only wins on tiny numbers"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>No, 15 is unique in that <i>all</i> multiplications by a known constant coprime to 15 correspond to bit rotations and/or bit flips. For 2047 that only occurs for a teeny tiny fraction of the selectable multipliers.<p>Shor's algorithm specifies that you should pick the base (which determines the multipliers) at random. Somehow picking a rare base that is cheap to do really does start overlapping with knowing the factors as part of making the circuit. By far the biggest cheat you can do is to "somehow" pick a number g such that g^2=1 (mod n) but g isn't 1 or N-1. Because that's exactly the number that Shor's algorithm is looking for, and the whole thing collapses into triviality.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Tue, 10 Mar 2026 17:05:07 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47325992</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47325992</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47325992</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "The “JVG algorithm” only wins on tiny numbers"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>What do you mean? The original 2019 supremacy experiment was eventually simulated, as better classical methods were found, but the followups are still holding strong (for example [4] and [5]). 
There was recently a series of blog posts by Dominik Hangleiter summarizing the situation: [1][2][3].<p>[1]: <a href="https://quantumfrontiers.com/2026/01/06/has-quantum-advantage-been-achieved/" rel="nofollow">https://quantumfrontiers.com/2026/01/06/has-quantum-advantag...</a><p>[2]: <a href="https://quantumfrontiers.com/2026/01/25/has-quantum-advantage-been-achieved-part-2-considering-the-evidence/" rel="nofollow">https://quantumfrontiers.com/2026/01/25/has-quantum-advantag...</a><p>[3]: <a href="https://quantumfrontiers.com/2026/02/28/what-is-next-in-quantum-advantage/" rel="nofollow">https://quantumfrontiers.com/2026/02/28/what-is-next-in-quan...</a><p>[4]: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.04792" rel="nofollow">https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.04792</a><p>[5]: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.02501" rel="nofollow">https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.02501</a></p>
]]></description><pubDate>Tue, 10 Mar 2026 09:28:40 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47320898</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47320898</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47320898</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "The “JVG algorithm” only wins on tiny numbers"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>What reviewers? It's not a peer reviewed article.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Tue, 10 Mar 2026 09:17:49 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47320818</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47320818</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47320818</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "The “JVG algorithm” only wins on tiny numbers"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Agree. Scott is exactly correct when he just straight calls it crap.<p>It's inaccurate to say it wins on small numbers because on small numbers you would use classical computers. By the time you get to numbers that take more than a minute to factor classically, and start dreaming of quantum computers, you're well beyond the size where you could tractably do the proposed state preparation.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Tue, 10 Mar 2026 08:38:00 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47320542</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47320542</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47320542</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "The “JVG algorithm” only wins on tiny numbers"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>The very first demonstration of factoring 15 with a quantum computer, back in 2001, used a valid modular exponentiation circuit [1].<p>The trickiest part of the circuit is they compile conditional multiplication by 4 (mod 15) into two controlled swaps. That's a very elegant way to do the multiplication, but most modular multiplication circuits are much more complex. 15 is a huge outlier on the difficulty of actually doing the modular exponentiation. Which is why so far 15 is the only number that's been factored by a quantum computer while meeting the bar of "yes you have to actually do the modular exponentiation required by Shor's algorithm".<p>[1]: <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0112176#page=15" rel="nofollow">https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0112176#page=15</a></p>
]]></description><pubDate>Tue, 10 Mar 2026 08:31:09 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47320501</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47320501</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47320501</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "Evidence of the bouba-kiki effect in naïve baby chicks"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>For each chick they do 24 trials divided into 4 blocks with retraining on the ambiguous shape and actual rewards after each block. During the actual tests they didn't give rewards. In figure 1 they show the data bucketed by trial index. It's a bit surprising it doesn't show any apparent effect vs trial number, e.g. the first trial after retraining being slightly different.<p>I have to admit I'm super skeptical there's not some stupid mistake here. Definitely thought provoking. But I wish they'd kept iteratively removing elements until the correlation stopped happening, so they could nail down causation more precisely.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Sun, 22 Feb 2026 08:18:19 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47109307</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47109307</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47109307</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by Strilanc in "Recent discoveries on the acquisition of the highest levels of human performance"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Wasn't this study immediately debunked due to bad statistical methods? See <a href="https://zenodo.org/records/18002186" rel="nofollow">https://zenodo.org/records/18002186</a><p>> <i>Using simple simulations,we show that this pattern arises naturally from collider bias when selection into elitesamples depends on both early and adult performance. Consequently, associationsestimated within elite samples are descriptively accurate for the selected population,but causally misleading, and should not be used to infer developmental mechanisms</i></p>
]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 23 Jan 2026 01:05:18 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46727115</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46727115</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46727115</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[Quantum Computing in the Second Quantum Century [video]]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Article URL: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_UoJFyMazXQ&list=PLh7C25oO7PW209STGTJOXRDbidmUO-FWu">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_UoJFyMazXQ&list=PLh7C25oO7PW209STGTJOXRDbidmUO-FWu</a></p>
<p>Comments URL: <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46638510">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46638510</a></p>
<p>Points: 1</p>
<p># Comments: 0</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 15 Jan 2026 20:13:05 +0000</pubDate><link>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_UoJFyMazXQ&amp;list=PLh7C25oO7PW209STGTJOXRDbidmUO-FWu</link><dc:creator>Strilanc</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46638510</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46638510</guid></item></channel></rss>