It really should be shameful to use unqualified adjectives in headline claims without also providing the supporting evidence.

"One Five Five Two Three One" is 6 words, 6 syllables long where as "One Hundred and Thirty Two Thousand" is 6 words, 9 syllables long and conveys less information. Even shortening it to "One Hundred Thirty Two Thousand" is still 5 words, 8 syllables long and conveys less information.

You can also easily convey high order digits first by using a unambiguous "and/add" construction: "Thousand Two Three One Add One Five Five". You have now conveyed the three high order digits in 5 words, 5 syllables. You also convey the full number in 9 words, 9 syllables in contrast to "One Hundred Thirty Two Thousand One Hundred Fifty Five" which is 9 words, 14 syllables.

You could go even further and express things in pseudo-scientific notation which would be even more general and close to as efficient. "Zero E Three (10^3) Two Three One" which is 6 words, 6 syllables, but no longer requires unique separator words like "Thousand", "Million", "Billion", etc. This shows even greater efficiency if you are conveying "One Hundred Thirty Thousand" which would be something more like "Zero E Four (10^4) Three One" since the scientific notation digit position description is highly uniform.

This distinction might seem somewhat arbitrary since this just seems like it is changing the order for the sake of things. However, the advantage of little-endian description is that it is non-contextual. When you say the number "One" it literally always means the one's place "One". If you wish to speak of a different positional "One" you would prefix it with the position e.g. "Zero E Three (10^3) One". In contrast, in the normal way of speaking numbers "One" could mean any positional one. Are you saying "One Hundred", "One Thousand", "One Hundred Million"? You need to wait for subsequent words to know what "One" is being said. Transcription must fundamentally buffer a significant fraction of the word stream to disambiguate.

It also results in the hilariously duplicative "One Hundred Thirty Two Thousand One Hundred Fifty Five" which has positional signifiers for basically every word. "One Hundred Thir-ty Thousand One Hundred Fif-ty Five”. Fully 8 of the 14 syllables are used for positional disambiguation to reduce necessary lookahead. "And/Add" constructions get you that for a fraction of the word and syllable count. They allow arbitrary chunking since you can separate digit streams on any boundary. It also reinforces the fact that numbers are just composites of their components which may help with numeracy.

Little endian is actually just better in every respect, expect for compatibility and familiarity, if we use our modern robust knowledge of arithmetic to formulate the grammar rules.

You should actually use format-swapping loads/stores (i.e deserialization/serialization).

This is because your computer can not compute on values of non-native endianness. As such, the value is logically converted back and forth on every operation. Of course, a competent optimizer can elide these conversions, but such actions fundamentally lack machine sympathy.

The better model is viewing the endianness as a serialization format and converting at the boundaries of your compute engine. This ensures you only need to care about endianness when serializing and deserializing wire formats and that you have no accidental mixing of formats in your internals; everything has been parsed to native before any computation occurs.

Essentially, non-native endianness should only exist in memory and preferably only memory filled in by the outside world before being parsed.

The words they used, as commonly understood by the target audience, were intentionally crafted to be interpreted differently than what they were going to say they meant in court. They spent time, effort, and money, ran focus groups, and carefully selected and curated their words to be incorrectly interpreted by the target audience to reach knowingly false conclusions.

The correct standard should be that they spent time, effort, and money, ran focus groups, and carefully selected and curated their words to be correctly interpreted by the target audience to reach true conclusions. Their statements should only be accidentally incorrect in proportion to the time and effort spent crafting and distributing them.

"Technically, your honor", should be treated as the ethical abomination it is.

To be fair, the limiting factor in remediation is usually finding a reproducible test case which a vulnerability is by necessity. But, I would still bet most systems have plenty of bugs in their bug trackers which are accompanied by a reproducible test case which are still bottlenecked on remediation resources.

This is of course orthogonal to the fact that patching systems that are insecure by design into security has so far been a colossal failure.

It is advisable to not grasp at straws to think up ways that highly paid lawyers are not saying exactly the words they have approved. That is literally their job and they are good at it.

If they meant something more expansive they can do so. It is not the public’s job to do it for them while letting them retreat to the legally binding interpretation at their pleasure.

In light of the correct legal interpretation of their words, being only the specific letters, we can see that your interpretation is incorrect.

> They know of a lot of attack attempts

No, their statement says nothing about attack attempts.

> so far they have no reason to believe any were successful

No, their statement says nothing about their belief, only their explicit knowledge. Their statement says nothing about their investigation practices or whether they even attempted to investigate and learn about attacks. Their statement says nothing about non-mercenary attacks.

Their statement is technically correct as long as any successful attacks they know about are not explicitly known to be committed by mercenarys.

You have presented no evidence as to the overall cost of this mystical unstoppable drone swarm. In contrast, we do know that shotguns, machine guns, and bullets are cheap, mass-produced, and mass-deployed by the tens of millions.

The key unknown of my proposal is the bulk cost and production of a small automated turret or fighter drone that can economically and flexibly deploy cheap bullet interceptors to asymmetrically defeat expensive drones. However, the operational requirements for such devices are simple and within the range of existing technology.

There is no clear evidence that cheap explosive drone swarms are magically cheaper than cheap fighter drone swarms or cheap ground drone swarms. It could easily go either way and without a rigorous actual analysis you and I are both unqualified to determine what is actually dominant.

A drone that can go 300 km/h is way more than 100 $, you are in the thousands of dollar range at that point. Turret wins if it blows up one.

Also, it could probably blow up more than one since at 300 km/h you would get 0.5 seconds to respond and I was arguing 0.1 seconds per target anywhere in a full 360. 0.25 seconds for anywhere on a full 360 would be enough for 2 and that is within human capability.

> you send in a cruise missile to clear it out

Cool, you sent in a hundred thousand dollar cruise missile to blow up a thousand dollar turret. Turret wins. Also you can put wheels on the turret, so it might not even be there.

Now you are probably going to argue about a drone that goes 1000 km/h at which point what you have is a cruise missile which costs tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars. At that point the entire argument about drones being too cheap to cost-effectively stop is moot.

Or you might argue that the drones just go high. 50 m is a ludicrously low flight ceiling. But then your drone can not explode on contact. You could use a drone that drops explosives, but that still requires flying over the target. High flying drones are easier to detect, and you could counter that with flying shotgun drones or turret mounted machine guns which have ranges in the hundreds to thousands of meters and would still only cost a few dollars of ammo per kill.

My main point is that bullets can easily disable a cheap drone and are much cheaper than a cheap drone. You just need a cost-effective way of deploying mass bullets against mass drones. Logical answers are ground deployments around targets or drones with bullets that cost-effectively shoot down drones without bullets.

You will then likely get into a arms race of fighter drones to protect your bomber drones. And scale up your drones until they are not easily bullet-destroyable. But then your drone costs have likely increased to the point where anti-air cannons shooting 100 $ explosive shells are cost-effective. And so on and so forth.

We have these things called wheels. Or you could mount it on a drone.

> Meanwhile your guns shoot birds and once in a while - an occasional bystander

We are discussing protecting military bases or military assets.

> Some drones just drop grenades

That requires flying above the target. See counter-point 1.

Please put in the minimal effort needed to follow through at least a few steps of argument and counter-argument in your head. I assure you I am not putting in as little effort into my arguments as you did.

I bet you could do aiming and firing in less than 0.1 seconds with nearly 100% accuracy in the 50 meter range which would enable ~10 destroyed drones per unit if the drones are going 150 km/h.

Shotgun pellets are also basically entirely safe when shot into the air as they have low falling velocity enabling usage when shooting over populated areas.

NMIs will not nest, so there is no risk of arbitrary nesting. So, there should be at most three nesting levels: regular, interrupt (I suspect they do not do logging during interrupts so this may not even exist in their use case), non-maskable interrupt.

Off the top of my head I can think of at least 5 unique ways to not drop the sample with your idea of separate ring buffers being one of them.

Tesla’s actually have zero binocular vision coverage because the cameras have different focal lengths and are too close even if they did have the same focal lengths.

They are also below minimum vision requirements for driving in many states.

bpf_ringbuf_reserve() is perfectly fine to call from interrupt context. The problem is that you are manipulating the same data structure from non-interrupt and interrupt context. Your code was deadlocking with itself. You wrote every side of that deadlock.

For that matter, how are you even handling the deadlock detected return code? If the sampling event gets a deadlock error, that deadlock cause can not resolve until the context switch code you interrupted resolves. That means you can not reserve the space to store your sample. Are you just naively dropping that sample?

The only way this could be considered a issue is that it appears that the Linux kernel added the rqspinlock which is supposed to automatically detect incorrect code at runtime and kind of “un-incorrect” it. That piece of code did not correctly detect callers who were blindly using it incorrectly in ways that the writers probably expected to detect.

However, this entire escapade is absurd. Not only does this indicate that eBPF has gotten extensions that grossly violate any concept of sandboxing that proponents claim, I do not see how you can effectively program in the rqspinlock environment. Any lock acquire can now fail with a timeout because some poorly written eBPF program decided that deadlocks were a enjoyable activity. Every single code path that acquires more than one lock must be able to guarantee global consistency before every lock acquire.

For instance, you can not lock a sub-component for modification and then acquire a whole component lock to rectify the state since that second lock acquire may arbitrarily fail.

Furthermore, even if you do that all it does is turn deadlocks due to incorrect code into incredibly long multi-millisecond denials of service due to incorrect code. I mean, yes, bad is better than horrible, but it is still bad.

1. As I made abundantly clear, 20% is the passive ownership of the index. It has no relation to the index weighting which you are mentioning.

2. They have to buy 20% of the weighted value. The actual weight is 5x the float. I chose to use a weight of 100% instead of a multiple of the float as a simplification since any weighting greater than the float could result in a squeeze given a large enough passive/obligated ownership pool. However, since I was expecting this sort of "correction", I chose 20% passive ownership of the index (i.e. 1/5) so that they would have to buy 20% of the 25% which is 5%, the same amount as the 5% float. This would result in the passive investors having to purchase all of publicly traded stock which is the divide by zero point that spikes the stock. So, even if your correction was not wrong, I also already countered it.

3. Tracking errors are distinct from intentionally not tracking the index you are contractually obligated to match. You are insinuating that the target of these financial manipulations will defend their clients by ignoring their legal obligations and blaming it on "tracking error". While that is possible, I see no reason to assume that will be the case upfront or to do anything other than apply blame to the entity attempting to financially manipulate retirement accounts into lining their own pockets.

4. Yes, there are other insiders with shares. I used a simplified example where there is a single insider, the founder, to highlight the power that the insiders have over the pricing in such a squeeze. However, you also got this wrong because insiders usually have lockup periods after the IPO that are longer than the 15-days expected for index inclusion. As such, the fund managers would not be able to purchase any shares other than the public shares until after the first rebalance.

Suppose you had a index of 100 companys each with a market cap of 1 G$ for a total of 100 G$. You have passive investors owning 20 G$ of that index, amounting to 20% of the total, 20% of each company, and 200 M$ per company.

You then rotate out a company for a new one also worth 1 G$. The index is still 100 G$, but to match the index you are contractually required to sell your 20% ownership of the old company and are contractually required to buy 20% ownership of the new company.

However, the newly added company only released 5% of its shares to the public and the founder kept hold of the remaining 95%. Those fund managers are contractually obligated to buy 20% of the newly added company, but only 5% is available. Like a short squeeze, where the squeezer buys and holds supply so there are not enough purchasable shares to cover the shorts (obligated ownership), this is a financial divide by zero.

To get the remaining 15%, which they are contractually obligated to acquire, they must purchase from the founder. As they are in violation of their contract if they fail to acquire the remaining 15%, the founder now has complete control to dictate any price they want.

That is the scheme described: how to short squeeze retirement funds who do not even have shorts for fun and profit.

Note that this is a minor variation on my post on the same underlying topic here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47392325

[1] https://indexes.nasdaqomx.com/docs/NDX_Consultation-February... Section 3