And also lose $50 of tax revenue. I do not see how the government is any better off here.

Insurance prices risk. If risk goes up, so do prices. They will not lose (much) money (or not for long) [1], your insurance will just get a lot more expensive, maybe to the point you can no longer afford it. If the government tries to control prices, then insurers will just exit the market, or the only entrants will be severely under-capitalized, merely providing the veneer of insurance (e.g., because your mortgage lender requires it). This is already happening in Florida and Louisiana [2]. These insurers will simply go bankrupt in the event of a catastrophe, and you will be stuck with the loss.

[1] Technically, in a competitive environment, many insurance companies will operate with a (small) underwriting loss, but they make up the difference by investing the float during the time between when they collect the premiums and when they pay out on claims. They will not operate with an unbounded loss.

[2] https://www.wsj.com/finance/small-insurance-company-hurrican...

I do not think that this was that confusing. People [1] looked around at the beginning of the 2010's and saw

1) Mobile usage was growing exponentially and desktop was... not [2].

2) Every mobile OS shipped their own browser by default, or even went so far as to prevent other browsers from being used at all (iOS) [3].

3) Because Android and iOS both had non-trivial marketshare, neither could be called a "monopoly" so there was no way to use anti-trust law to get Firefox on devices as was done with Windows (not that this would have been a compelling strategy even if it were possible).

People took that set of facts and concluded Mozilla needed its own mobile OS in order to stay relevant.

What they underestimated was the amount of investment needed to make such an OS and get it on devices and the amount of time it would have to exist in a state of not being very good before it could compete with the established players (who were not standing still... people forget how bad Android was in the beginning). But if you look at the actual world we ended up in, with no mobile OS from Mozilla and a total Firefox marketshare that is less than desktop Safari's, it is hard to say that initial conclusion was incorrect.

[1] Full disclosure: I was a Mozilla employee at the time, though not involved in any of these decisions.

[2] I would say "desktop was shrinking", but to everyone's surprise it actually remained fairly steady in absolute numbers, although it did become a smaller slice of a much larger pie. In 2010 everyone expected it to shrink, though.

[3] Mozilla did ship a re-skin around mobile Safari to try to get some brand presence, but was still at the mercy of what web standards Safari chose to implement, and you could hardly call it a first-class experience. Eventually iOS loosened their rules, but no one could have predicted that back then.

In both cases you are best off restricting things to what you actually use.

The rebalancing required to maintain equal weights means constantly selling your winners and buying more of your losers. That creates volatility drag. Stock returns are highly skewed: only about 4% of stocks outperform the market, and are responsible for most of its gains. By keeping your allocation to those stocks small through constant rebalancing, you are missing out on a large part of their gains. The vast majority of stocks underperform.

Maintaining the equal weighting also requires constant trading, which generally means higher fees. A market weighted fund, in contrast, naturally maintains its desired balance in response to price movements, without any trading.

Also, the equal weighting ignores the amount of outstanding float for each company. If the fact that NASDAQ has not (historically) been float-adjusted (a common anti-SpaceX talking point) gave you concern, this is even worse, due to the multiple orders of magnitude difference between the largest and smallest companies in the S&P. If enough money enters the equal-weight index, this can spark large amounts of buying in (relatively) small companies that is divorced from their economic performance.

The equal-weight index has outperformed the market-weighted index in some periods (not in recent memory), but with higher volatility (so worse risk-adjusted returns). That outperformance can mostly be explained by factor tilts implicit in the equal weighting (e.g., a higher allocation to mid-cap value stocks).

You would probably be better off with a mix of market-weighted funds explicitly designed to give you the factor tilts and risk exposure you want.

If hardware were so magical in creating new value generally, TSMC would be designing the chips instead of selling fabrication as a service.

That is what US chip companies used to do, by the way (back when there was silicon in Silicon Valley, before they got their lunch eaten by Taiwan). If TSMC had to design all of the chips they fabricate now, they would be doing a lot less business. Conversely, if any other company that wanted to design a chip had to build their own cutting-edge fab first, NVIDIA would not exist.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%26P_500

We solved pensions. People have defined-contribution plans now. I would expect insurance float to dwarf pensions as a source of PE funding.

The real reason PE exists is because it charges high fees. The financial industry does not make products to serve customer needs, though by happy accident that sometimes happens. It makes products to charge fees. Index funds removed a big chunk of the fees that active mutual funds used to charge, so financiers went looking for a replacement.

Even if you snapped your fingers and all remaining pensions (and insurance float?) disappeared, PE is aggressively going after individual retirement accounts, now. Most insidiously, trying to work their way into the "target date" funds that are the defaults for most plans. So "solving pensions" will not make PE go away.

Because unlike many commodities, electricity, once generated, is hard to store, yet supply must match demand in real time. You need to meet peak demand, even if normal usage is not as high. If you pay purely for usage, that might not send enough price signals to ensure that you have the necessary capacity when you need it. https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/enn/explainer-how-capac... has a more detailed overview of how markets are being structured to provide capacity, separate from actual generation.

Even before you get to the broader ecosystem, I wouldn't want daily standups, weekly 1:1s, on-call rotations, weekly business reviews, monthly business reviews, quarterly reports, "emergency" all-hands meetings, mandatory compliance training, constant IT churn, zero-based budgeting, fighting for headcount, constant interviewing, fighting for management buy-in (and against active attempts at management sabotage), managing up, managing down, peer reviews, performance reviews, promotion boards...

I also don't want to spend six months negotiating a contract, sign an NDA, disclose tax records to prove I have other clients, maintain liability insurance, and etc., for one week's worth of work, during which I must track every fraction of an hour and itemize everything I do, followed by two months of dealing with some archaic billing system and another three months wondering if accounts payable will ever actually send the money.

I just want to apply my decades of domain experience in a community of deserved trust and feel like someone actually gives a damn.

Worse, it might not generate a return. If you have enough profits, you just buy anyone who successfully produced something innovative. Let them take the risks. As Cisco used to say, "Silicon Valley is our R&D lab."

It is a very difficult mindset to argue against.

> ... please stop working on projects distracting from the complex and necessary work of browser and web standards stewardship.

> Ditching any direct financial ties to Google or any other browser vendor is both important and necessary...

are inherently contradictory. If you do not want Mozilla to have revenue from search vendors that also have browsers, it has to come from somewhere else. Or are you suggesting they switch the default search engine back to Yahoo [0]?

I am not trying to defend the projects they have chosen to work on, but you have to understand that reducing dependence on Google is exactly why they are working on them [1].

[0] Even when they did that, it was for the US only, and Google was still the default for most of the world.

[1] Although in this case, this appears to come from the Thunderbird organization, so unrelated to the browser. Money is fungible, though.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._K._Chesterton#Chesterton's_...

There are regulations. E.g., in the US, 17 CFR § 40.11 prohibits contracts on "terrorism, assassination, war, gaming, or an activity that is unlawful under any State or Federal law" [0]. The problem is that those responsible for enforcing those regulations are currently uninterested in doing so [1].

[0] https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/40.11

[1] https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/9183-26

I think the author meant to say, "ArcCosh[-2 + 0.001 I] returns 1.31696 + 3.14102 I but ArcCosh[-2 - 0.001 I] returns 1.31696 - 3.14102 I," because we are talking about defining ArcCosh[] on the branch cut discontinuity, so there is no need to bring Sinh[] into it (and if we do, we find the limits are the same: the imaginary component goes to zero and Sinh[ArcCosh[-2 +/- t*I]] approaches -Sqrt[3] as t goes to zero from above or below). I am not sure what went wrong to get what they wrote.

Another obvious question to ask is who is providing the money that is being lent? Those are the people who now won't be paid back. The assumption is that these are people with predictable, long-term obligations who can lock up their cash for a long time: pensions, insurance companies, endowments, etc. Hopefully they are allocating a responsible amount of their portfolio to something as risky as private credit, but as the details are private, it can be really hard to know.

There has also been a big push over the past year to put private credit assets into retail 401k's (which, in theory, also should be okay with locking up funds for a long time, but in practice, maybe less so), most insidiously by having private credit assets held in target date funds (which are the default funds for many plans).

Many private credit funds also increase their leverage by borrowing from actual banks.

All of that should pose less systemic risk than if banks subject to bank runs were lending all of the money. But that has to be balanced by the fact that these are unregulated entities taking more risks than banks would. Long-term average default rates on high-yield bonds are around 4%, so 9.2% is high, but not in panic-inducing territory yet. Who knows what they will look like in the event of an actual recession.