;; in ~/.config/agent-safehouse/no-network.sb
  (deny network*)

  safehouse --append-profile="$HOME/.config/agent-safehouse/no-network.sb" -- 

This also applies to sandboxing an Electron app: Electron has its own built-in sandboxing via sandbox-exec, so if you're wrapping an Electron app in your own sandboxing, you have to disable that inner sandbox (with Electron's --no-sandbox or ELECTRON_DISABLE_SANDBOX=1). In the repo, I have examples for minimal sandbox-exec rules required to run Claude Code[1] and VSCode[2] (so you can do --dangerously-skip-permission in their destop app and VSCode extension)

[1] https://github.com/eugene1g/agent-safehouse/blob/a7377924efa...

[2] https://github.com/eugene1g/agent-safehouse/blob/a7377924efa...

Big love for Pi - it was the first integration I added to Safehouse. I wanted something that offers strong guarantees across all agents (I test and write them nonstop), has no dependencies (e.g., the Node runtime), and is easy to customize, so I didn't use the Anthropic sandbox-runtime.

Yes, Safehouse should work for xcodebuild workloads in the way you described - try to run it, watch for failures, extend the profile, try again. Your agent can do this in a loop by itself - just feed it the repo as there are many integrations that are not enabled by default that will help it.

The alternative would be “no site”, which is still somehow worse.

Alternatively, you can feed these instructions to your LLM and have it generate you a minimal policy file and a shell wrapper https://agent-safehouse.dev/llm-instructions.txt

Your point is totally fair for evaluating security tooling. A few notes -

1. I implemented this in Bash to avoid having an opaque binary in the way.

2. All sandbox-exec profiles are split up into individual files by specific agent/integration, and are easily auditable (https://github.com/eugene1g/agent-safehouse/tree/main/profil...)

3. There are E2E tests validating sandboxing behavior under real agents

4. You don't even need the Safehouse Bash wrapper, and can use the Policy Builder to generate a static policy file with minimal permissions that you can feed to sandbox-exec directly (https://agent-safehouse.dev/policy-builder). Or feed the repo to your LLMs and have them write your own policy from the many examples.

5. This whole repo should be a StrongDM-style readme to copy&paste to your clanker. I might just do that "refactor", but for now added LLM instructions to create your own sandbox-exec profiles https://agent-safehouse.dev/llm-instructions.txt

That's not the case with Agent Safehouse - you can give your agent access to select ~/.dotfiles and env, but by default it gets nothing (outside of CWD)

For handling global rules (like ~/.gitconfig and ~/.gitignore), I keep a local policy file that whitelists my "shared globals" paths, and I tell Safehouse to include that policy by default. I just updated the README with an example that might be useful[1]. I also enabled access to ~/.gitignore by default as it's a common enough default.

For process management, there is a blurry line about how much to allow without undermining the sandboxing concept. I just added new integrations[2] to allow more process control and lldb, but I don't know this area well. You can try cloning the repo, asking your agents to tweak the rules in the repo until your use-case works, and send a PR - I'll merge it!

Alternatively, using the "custom policy" feature above, you can selectively grant broad access to your tools (you can use log monitoring to see rejections, and then add more permisions into the policy file)

[1] https://github.com/eugene1g/agent-safehouse?tab=readme-ov-fi...

[2] https://github.com/eugene1g/agent-safehouse/pull/7

Codex: IIRC, only shell commands are sandboxed; the actual agent runtime is not.