Hopefully we'll get there in the next 200-300 years.

This is how a fiat currency is supposed to work. Earn it, then buy some gold, silver, real estate, crypto, or whatever. And inflation is not necessary a bad thing.

>A Debian bug that was filed at the end of May serves as a reminder that even open-source software is not immune to some of the problems of proprietary software. In this case, Chromium 43 was silently downloading a browser extension to enable the "OK Google" voice activation "feature" of the browser

Oh shit, that's scary...

There is only one issue I had with Debian: I don't like/understand how it's package manager handles unneeded software.

For example:

1. I installed Debian with the Gnome interface.

2. Decided to try KDE, installed it alongside Gnome.

3. Deleted KDE. But then there still were lots of KDE-related packages left. I tried `apt autoremove` and some other stuff, but no matter what I couldn't figure out how to easily remove all unneeded packages and return to the previous state.

>GrapheneOS is heavily focused on security enhancements making exploitation significantly harder:

>grapheneos.org/features

>Those other operating systems [Calyx and Lineage] don't improve resistance against exploitation and won't provide more resistance against an exploit working against AOSP/stock.

>If they specifically target GrapheneOS and put work into adjusting their exploit chains and finding new bugs as necessary, then they could certainly develop an exploit working against GrapheneOS. Costs will be higher and they'll usually need to specifically take it into account.

>Firmware exposed to remote attack surface like the radios (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular, NFC) and GPU is generally a lot harder to exploit than the OS and those components are isolated. It's much rarer and generally involves using an OS exploit to bypass the component isolation.

>Nearly all of these exploits are memory corruption bugs. GrapheneOS does actually provide hardening for firmware through attack surface reduction including the LTE only mode and other features. It can't directly harden firmware, but it can avoid exposing as much attack surface.

>So, for example, with the GrapheneOS 4G only mode enabled, vulnerabilities in 2G, 3G and 5G are not usable to exploit the cellular radio, only those exposed by 4G.

>The radio firmware also does have substantial hardening and internal sandboxing, but GrapheneOS can't improve it.

>GrapheneOS also fortifies the OS against exploitation by an attacker that has gained code execution on a component like the GPU or radio.

>Main hardening we provide is for the most common path of exploiting an RCE bug in userspace and then exploiting the kernel to escape sandbox.

GrapheneOS runs only on Pixel phones which have great hardware security.

Also, DON'T USE CopperheadOS: https://grapheneos.org/history/copperheados