Both Russia and China cannot match the US on very low observable technologies, so they have tried to make the most low observable platform they could and then attempt the air combat problem with different technologies that they ARE good at. The J-20 has doubled down on having very long range, capable air to air missiles, as well as being highly datalinked with other Chinese platforms.

The Russians don't have nearly as good AAMs so they're just trying to be as maneuverable as possible.

I have a much higher opinion of the J-20 than I do the SU-57.

If you're a NATO nation looking for a non-US jet that can satisfy your dual-capable needs, your only option is the Rafale.

[0] https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pd...

1) Lack of competent, forceful oversight from the program office. DOT&E reports about the F-35 program have, for years, given the program office recommendations that it has failed to follow.

2) A prime contractor (Lockheed-Martin) that restricts access to its data. The F-35 program had to sue LM in federal court to get access to the necessary data to make the Joint Simulation Environment (JSE) fully functional. In the end, the case was settled, but only after six years of battle. The report linked in the parent article describes how maintainers are not allowed access to servicing procedures that they have on other aircraft. I have seen this personally in flight test. Even something like a gear swing requires an LM certified Field Services Engineer to conduct.

3) A completely broken software release process. For many years in developmental flight test, we received software builds that were just entirely broken, as in, the jet would not start with that software loaded. The C2D2 process was advertised as fixing this, but really it was just a new name for the same old fly-fix-fly process. The parent report details entire versions that were skipped in the IOT&E process because they were so buggy. The program could have turned JSE into the final stop for new software builds before hitting the fleet, but it chose to pivot entirely into training instead.

I could keep going. A decade working in a program like this gives you a long list of things to talk about. But I'll stop here for now.

[0] https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2018-04-12-F-35-Completes-Mo...

https://www.darpa.mil/program/air-combat-evolution

I'm no GPS expert, I've read some of the theory had enough of a working understanding to deal with tactical navigation systems, but that was in my past. I remember using El-Rabbany's "Introduction to GPS" text.

[0] https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2022/11/18/f-35-costs-h...

I started on the program in August, 2010. I was 26 years old.

The program has just completed its Initial Operational Test & Evaluation, including its runs for score in the Joint Simulation Environment. I am 40 years old.

I believe what I do now is important, but getting an issue past test and into the release that's sent to customers isn't nearly as satisfying as "I fixed the tailhook last night, which let today's flight test happen". I miss having an aircraft that I can touch.