> Remove the timeout, and a legitimately stuck core hangs the platform on the first SMI. Increase the timeout, and you kill performance on many-core platforms that are forced to quiesce all cores every SMM entry. It's not clear what the best path forward is, or if there is even a path forward at all.

I agree that the migration path should be clearly documented.

> Very amusing worldview.

It’s ironic that you’re displaying the exact behavior pointed out by the GP:

> This is how you behave when you think you're so much smarter than everyone around you that consequences don't apply to you.

MDM is implemented to protect company assets regardless of the actions of the users. It would not be due diligence on the part of the director to trust you to wipe your own device.

It’s not clear to me what the point of your comment is other than illustrating that you’re smarter than your director.

Re: specific keys for specific usernames: I can appreciate that you wish DKIM allowed for this, and I could imagine it being handy, but that was never the problem DKIM set out to solve — DKIM and SPF are all about be domain.

I’m also not sure it’s a great idea — the sender identity should be under the control of the sender. If you control the domain @foo.com, you could use that ability to assert that an email came from Bob, even if Bob never sent it. Contrast that with Bob signing the email using his own private key.

This API returns a handle to the selected directory, giving the webpage ongoing read/write access to the directory.

You couldn't use the former to e.g. create a local-first notes app that stores its files on disk.

> There remains a clear penalty for being an open LLM user.

The conversation here _around_ the article is interesting, but the article itself boils down to “I’m going to try using open models and hope for the best.”