Edit: It looks like there's already something similar using sigstore in npm https://docs.npmjs.com/generating-provenance-statements#abou.... My understanding is that its use is not widespread though and it's mostly used to verify the publisher.

[1] https://nostarch.com/zero-day

[2] https://nostarch.com/hacking2.htm

[3] https://ia801309.us.archive.org/26/items/Wiley.The.Shellcode...

A good starting point for hardening your servers is CIS Hardening Guides and the relevant scripts.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weapons_of_Math_Destruction

A password manager is a big database of passwords. There is a master password that decrypts the database and from there you can use your passwords. Notice that hashes are one-way operations thus not used in password managers. The benefits of using a password manager are that that users need to remember and handle only one password, that of their password manager, the rest of the passwords are unique and can be rotated quickly. Ideally, your password manager does a few more things, including taking precautions against leaving traces of passwords in memory etc.

There's another part of commercial password managers which is mostly convenience functionality. Passwords are synced across devices, specific members access specific passwords etc.

Some people do use local password managers, depending on their threat model (i.e., who's after them) and their level of expertise/time on their hands. Setting up something locally requires taking additional precautions (such as permissions, screen locks etc.) that are typically handled by commercial password managers.

Reg. Okta, Okta is an identity provider. In theory, identity providers can provide strong guarantees regarding a user, i.e., "I authenticated him thus I gave him those token to pass around". Strong guarantees can include a number of things, including Multi-factor Authentication, VPN restrictions etc.

Funny story: during an internal red team engagement on a previous employer of mine, we took over the local password manager of a subset of the security org, twice. The first time, they had a VNC, unauthenticated, with the password manager running and the file unlocked. The second time, a team conveniently used Git to sync their password manager file, with their password tracked.

Edit: We went through the process for everything, including having a provider ship us a back-up solution to pentest. My desk became everyone's favourite place in the building :P

is not a good enough argument.

For the story, SIP is Apple's "rootless". Effectively the OS runs with less privileges than root. Disabling SIP significantly increases the attack surface.

That being said, I'm grateful that someone decided to do something more native for containers in macOS.

That being said, Apple implements a ton of mitigations, both on a hardware level and on a software level which generally makes exploits on Apple devices interesting to analyze and see how they bypassed stuff.

Edit: For clarity, Apple requires both codesigning and implements PAC, among others. mmap'ing or ROP won't make the cut in this case.

Creating backdoors that allow encryption schemes to be subverted is _fundamentally_ going to cause harm on the internet, and eventually fail the weakest users/those that need privacy/security the most.

A mechanism that can subvert cryptographic protocols can be used by any party, including oppressive regimes, private entities etc. that have the resources/will/knowledge to use the backdoor etc. Backdoors harm both the trust on the web (which can have an impact on economic transactions among many others) and the people that need security/privacy the most. In the meantime, criminals will wise up and move their operations elsewhere where no backdoors exist.

We basically end up with a broken internet, we are putting people in harm's way and the criminals we are targeting are probably updating their OPSEC/MO not to rely on E2EE.

Privacy features like user-agent reduction, IP reduction, preventing cross- site storage, and fingerprint randomization make it more difficult to distinguish or reidentify individual clients, which is great for privacy, but makes fighting fraud more difficult. This matters to users because making the web more private without providing new APIs to developers could lead to websites adding more:

- sign-in gates to access basic content

- invasive user fingerprinting, which is less transparent to users and more difficult to control

- excessive challenges (SMS verification, captchas)

My question is whether there is any data to back up those claims.

Generally, the better we become in introducing mitigations, the more expensive attacks become and attackers have bosses, budgets and deadlines. They will try to find other avenues to land on a target :-)

[1]https://objectivebythesea.org/v5/talks/OBTS_v5_iBeer.pdf

The first library has, for the biggest part, engineering books. Everyone can order books and everyone can borrow them. Most modern books also exist internally as e-books so the physical library currently is a mix of books, 3D prints, random music collections etc.

The second library is everything else. Multiple copies of various titles are available to take and keep, for free. Only requirement is to inform someone if the copy you picked up is the last one. Many employees are totally oblivious about this library.

Although I don't write code full-time, when I do this is the part I enjoy more. People reviewing my code and coming up with better solutions on that same problem amazes me.