<rss version="2.0" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Hacker News: l0kod</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/user?id=l0kod</link><description>Hacker News RSS</description><docs>https://hnrss.org/</docs><generator>hnrss v2.1.1</generator><lastBuildDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2026 03:18:10 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hnrss.org/user?id=l0kod" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by l0kod in "Island: Linux sandboxing tool powered by Landlock"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Island makes Landlock practical for everyday workflows by acting as a high-level wrapper and policy manager. Developed alongside the kernel feature and its Rust libraries, it bridges the gap between raw security mechanisms and user activity.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Dec 2025 12:01:40 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46160135</link><dc:creator>l0kod</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46160135</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46160135</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[Island: Linux sandboxing tool powered by Landlock]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Article URL: <a href="https://github.com/landlock-lsm/island">https://github.com/landlock-lsm/island</a></p>
<p>Comments URL: <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46160134">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46160134</a></p>
<p>Points: 3</p>
<p># Comments: 1</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 05 Dec 2025 12:01:40 +0000</pubDate><link>https://github.com/landlock-lsm/island</link><dc:creator>l0kod</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46160134</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46160134</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by l0kod in "Landrun: Sandbox any Linux process using Landlock, no root or containers"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Landlock supports scoped abstract UNIX socket: <a href="https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/landlock.html#ipc-scoping" rel="nofollow">https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/landlock.html#ipc-scop...</a><p>Landlock doesn't use namespaces, they are orthogonal.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Tue, 25 Mar 2025 17:26:49 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43473727</link><dc:creator>l0kod</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43473727</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43473727</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by l0kod in "Landrun: Sandbox any Linux process using Landlock, no root or containers"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Seccomp is not an access control system, but Landlock is. Seccomp limits the kernel attack surface and Landlock enforces an access control. They are complementary.<p>With Landlock, the access control is at the right layer, and the semantic is guaranteed to be the same even if the kernel gets new syscalls. Landlock is the closest thing to Pledge/Unveil we can get with the Linux constraints (and it is gaining new features).</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Tue, 25 Mar 2025 17:08:27 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43473546</link><dc:creator>l0kod</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43473546</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43473546</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by l0kod in "Landrun: Sandbox any Linux process using Landlock, no root or containers"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>For instance, with Pledge, the "dns" promise is implemented with hardcoded path in the kernel. Linux is complex because it is versatile and flexible. Controlling access to such features requires some complexity and the kernel might not be enough.<p>About interfaces, another example is that Unveil is configured with path names but Landlock uses file descriptors instead (more flexible).<p>Also, these OpenBSD primitives only apply to the current executed binary, there is no nested sandboxes because the goal is not to create this kind of secure environment but mainly to secure a <i>trusted</i> binary.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Sun, 23 Mar 2025 00:00:51 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43449715</link><dc:creator>l0kod</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43449715</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43449715</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by l0kod in "Landrun: Sandbox any Linux process using Landlock, no root or containers"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>BSD systems ship a kernel and user space, which simplifies a lot of things. Linux is more flexible but it comes at a cost. Adding new security features can also be challenging for other reasons. Anyway, Landlock is one of these new security primitives, and it is gaining new features over time.<p>The Landlock interface must not change the underlying semantic of what is allowed or denied, otherwise it could break apps build for an older or a newer kernel. However, these apps should still use all the available security features. This is challenging.<p>Landlock provides a way to define fine-grained security policies. I would not say the kernel interface is complex (rather flexible), but what really matter are the user space library interfaces and how they can safely abstract complexity.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Sat, 22 Mar 2025 21:44:45 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43448884</link><dc:creator>l0kod</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43448884</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43448884</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by l0kod in "Landrun: Sandbox any Linux process using Landlock, no root or containers"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Namespaces (used by containers) are very powerful but they are also a door to a large attack surface: <a href="https://lwn.net/Articles/673597/" rel="nofollow">https://lwn.net/Articles/673597/</a><p>Landlock is (only) an access control system, but it's designed to let any process use it, including potentially untrusted ones, which makes it suitable for any apps. It's close and complementary to seccomp.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Sat, 22 Mar 2025 21:22:16 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43448747</link><dc:creator>l0kod</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43448747</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43448747</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by l0kod in "Landrun: Sandbox any Linux process using Landlock, no root or containers"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>It takes time to develop theses features, but Landlock is gaining new network filtering features. We are working in a way to control socket creation according to their protocols, and also a way to filter UDP (which makes sense to developers and users).<p>From the point of view of an app developer, it might not make sense to filters peers but services (ports) instead, and filtering peers without their names would not be ideal (the kernel doesn't know about DNS, only IPs). Anyway, this feature might come one day if someone want to work on it, but we follow well-tested incremental development.<p>Netfiler is a privileged network feature that allows to do almost anything with the network, which makes it unsuitable for (app/unprivileged) sandboxing.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Sat, 22 Mar 2025 20:06:05 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43448239</link><dc:creator>l0kod</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43448239</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43448239</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by l0kod in "Landrun: Sandbox any Linux process using Landlock, no root or containers"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>We are working on a JSON/TOML format for Landlock, with the related library, and bindings for several languages: <a href="https://github.com/landlock-lsm/landlockconfig" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/landlock-lsm/landlockconfig</a><p>We are working to make it part of the OCI runtime specification too.<p>Using existing configuration format would not work because Landlock has its own unique properties: unprivileged, nested sandboxes, dedicated Linux syscalls, and a good compatibility story with opt-in and incremental features.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Sat, 22 Mar 2025 19:50:15 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43448137</link><dc:creator>l0kod</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43448137</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43448137</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by l0kod in "NsJail: A light-weight process isolation tool for Linux"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Namespace are very useful to build virtual environments, but I think it's important to keep in mind that they are not designed for sandboxing and don't provide security guarantees (e.g. mount point propagation), nor fine-grained access rights, nor security events (e.g. logs)... which might be OK according to use cases. Also, namespaces increase the attack surface of the kernel (e.g. vulnerabilities that can be reached through user namespaces). That being said, even if Landlock can control the most important filesystem access rights, not all of them are supported yet. New kernel releases bring new Landlock features (e.g. IPC, network control). It takes some time to build a new and safe access control system but we'll get there!</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Fri, 07 Feb 2025 10:20:17 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42971137</link><dc:creator>l0kod</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42971137</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42971137</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by l0kod in "Show HN: Porting OpenBSD Pledge() to Linux"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>There is an ongoing work to support network access-control: <a href="https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220621082313.3330667-1-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com/" rel="nofollow">https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220621082313.3330667-1-konstan...</a></p>
]]></description><pubDate>Mon, 25 Jul 2022 17:40:17 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32228042</link><dc:creator>l0kod</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32228042</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32228042</guid></item></channel></rss>