How would this have helped here? The attackers included the radio. Most people don't have a faraday room at their disposal.

> For you're forced to not only upgrade the firmware but also install the Bitcoin "ledger app" (or whatever that is called) after you entered your seed into the device.

> Which is complete and total amateur hour.

How else would you incorporate protocol updates into your wallet? Although I do agree that it shouldn't be necessary to install these unless absolutely necessary to continue interacting with the blockchain network in question.

I'm all for consideration for others, especially when crammed into a tight space for hours on end, but once we get into the realm of purely psychological effects, where do we draw the line? For example, there are people that are absolutely convinced that my phone's electromagnetic radiation will cause them discomfort, yet in-flight Wi-Fi is a thing.

To be clear, I'm totally on board with limiting common allergens in airplane food, but please let me eat my own peanuts in peace instead of further facilitating mass hysteria.

Prioritization still matters. Agents will happily optimize your app for performance, but at least current ones seem like you need to explicitly tell them.

Ledger's mistake here was solely assuming that fitting hardware capable of long-range (or even global, in this case) communication into the tiny footprint of their device's case was impossible. I'm not in their industry, but I'd honestly have guessed the same until this week.

[1] https://www.ledger.com/ledger-nano-x-bluetooth-security-mode...

Do you know anything about their security model to pass judgement like that? They actually have a quite thorough hardware security model, outlining which components are and aren't considered critical: https://www.ledger.com/ledger-nano-x-bluetooth-security-mode...

> As it is, this attack seemed quite trivial to implement.

Have you looked at the miniature LTE board implant? It's an extremely sophisticated attack against a very sophisticated target, in my view.

I suspect that the attackers here have been waiting for enough funds to land on compromised wallets to be worth their efforts and then withdrew everything at once, with comparably little chance to get caught.

Says who? I've bought single-use eSIM profiles for data while traveling without any KYC in the past; it's actually the norm, not the exception.

Some suppliers specifically advertise that, as well as accepting cryptocurrency.

Most people's computes run a lot of software, including a general-purpose OS with a huge attack surface and third-party applications, often with broad or even unconstrained access to all their files.

General purpose computers often also don't have tamper-proof secure storage; hardware wallets generally do.