You can see it all in GP's link. It's very readable.

Edit: I think it's an aerial picture, but my brain insists on seeing it as one taken from the surface.

(To be clear, since it's probably necessary, I'm asking a curiosity-driven question about the mechanism here, not throwing shade on the work. Given it's won the researchers a Nobel prize it's obviously highly significant.)

That is precisely the context of the debate. You seem to find it absurd, as do I, but the reason we're talking about whether LLMs are conscious in this thread has nothing to do with whether they are useful. It's because important people, such as Dario Amodei, are engaging in exactly the kind of moralising over "AI welfare" that you're scoffing at.

Edit: You're also massively under-stating the significance of individual cell behaviour. I expect "[h]uman neurons are ... [v]ery similar to those neurons found in a fruit fly" would draw hollow laughter from any cellular neuroscientist. Here's a random overview of a bunch of recent papers on the importance of cellular diversity in one small part of a mammal brain: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/cellular-neuroscience/a...

I think we have an extremely strong basis on which to say AI as it currently exists does not have conscious experiences, though, and if we start trying to pretend they do some real absurdities will result. Indeed the consequences could be pretty terrible in terms of power concentration, and I doubt it's a coincidence that those best placed to form a new priesthood of AI and tell everyone how it should and should not be treated are pushing the idea so strongly.

If you're going to try and debate something constructively this is not a good place to start from. I suggest avoiding making claims about the mental state and motivations of people you disagree with and instead explaining your position and asking why theirs differs. You may not agree with what they have to say but you might gain some better insights into why they think the way they do. It'll certainly be more fun than flinging insults back and forth anyway.

For my part, I'm quite certain that LLMs are not conscious despite being unable to define consciousness or specify any conclusive test for it. The reason these are not in conflict is down to the nature of consciousness and how it relates to knowledge and language.

Firstly, I know I am conscious with a higher degree of certainty than I know anything else because conscious experience is how I know anything else, up to and including that I exist (cogito ergo sum). For all I know every experience I have might be a trick. I might be a brain floating in a tank wired up to the Matrix, but even if so I am conscious.

Secondly, one of the things that I consciously experience is the relationship between consciousness itself and language in my mind. What I see is that language is smaller than, secondary to and somehow contained by consciousness. I consciously experience language but I also consciously experience much more than that, things that cannot be conveyed with language. Most of my experiences are like that, things that I could perhaps evoke in your mind by likening them to other, shared experiences, but that I could never concretely capture in language and unambiguously communicate. I know this because I experience those things and I experience language and I can perceive, directly, the categorical distinction between them.

To ask me to "define" or "prove" consciousness, then, is to ask me to capture in language the most extreme example of this categorical distinction. It's asking me to encapsulate in language not just one of the vast array of everyday experiences I have that cannot be so captured, but the entire thing, experience itself. It's just not possible.

But the fact I can't do this doesn't then imply that I don't know anything about consciousness and have no basis on which to hold a view such as "LLMs are not conscious". Indeed the reason I know I can't define consciousness is that I can perceive it and see that I can't. That same perception of and familiarity with consciousness is what enables me to form opinions about whether other people, creatures and things are likely to be conscious. I base these opinions on what I perceive of my own consciousness and what I know of how those other entities behave, came to be and work.

You can of course perfectly reasonably disagree with my opinions on those things, and you certainly have different conscious experiences than I do, but I hope the above makes it clear that the fact that I can't define or prove consciousness doesn't imply that I have no basis on which to form opinions about it.

Given the above it may surprise you to hear that I think true, conscious artificial intelligence is probably possible and that while I don't think it can be implemented by a classical algorithm I doubt it requires new physics or quantum mechanics. My speculation is that the continuum is both physically real and is (as it is represented in our existing physical theories) sufficient to allow it. Consciousness is larger than language but so is human understanding and if we keep going I expect it will eventually get us there. Nonlinear dynamics is where I'd look.

As for insecurity, I'm pretty sure spiders are conscious and that hasn't given me an inferiority complex, so I don't see why data centres being conscious would. I just don't think they are.

The sentence the judge handed down was the maximum available and more than the prosecutors requested. The defence was apealing the sentencing, which was the judge's choice, not the jury's verdict. The judge was influenced by the video (as the appeals court concluded) and, regardless of the intentions of the prosecution, seeing a fake image of the victim "forgiving" the defendant could have pushed him towards a tougher sentence.

I doubt the direction of the influence actually mattered for the appeals court decision, though - they just vacated the sentence as the video wasn't allowed by law - and as the sentence was the maximum possible for the conviction it doesn't sound like there was much risk in appealing.

There is no way Data could conclusively prove to a skeptic that he is conscious (and the show explores this) or indeed that you can prove to me that you are. It's also impossible for me to define consciousness. However, I know absolutely that I am conscious, I am very confident that you are too (unless I'm replying to a bot), along with many animals, and I am confident to a level somewhere in between those two that neither ChatGPT nor my trousers are conscious*. Taken together these statements don't contain any contradictions (although it is certainly possible to hold other, equally internally consistent, views).

How can this be? It's because of the nature of consciousness and how it relates to knowledge and language. I know I am conscious with a higher degree of certainty than I know anything else because conscious experience is how I know anything else, up to and including that I exist (cogito ergo sum). For all I know every experience I have might be a trick. I might be a brain floating in a tank wired up to the Matrix, but even if so I am conscious.

And one of the things I consciously experience is the relationship between consciousness itself and language in my mind. What I see is that language is smaller than, secondary to and somehow contained by consciousness. I consciously experience language but also consciously experience much more than that, things that cannot be conveyed with language. Most of my experiences are such that I could perhaps evoke them in your mind by likening them to other, shared experiences, but that I could never concretely capture them in language and unambiguously communicate them. I know that because I experience those things and I experience language and I can perceive, directly, the categorical distinction between them.

To ask me to "define" or "prove" consciousness, then, is to ask me to capture in language the most extreme example of this categorical distinction. It's asking me to encapsulate in language not just one of the vast array of everyday experiences I have that cannot be so captured, but the entire thing, experience itself. It's just not possible.

But the fact I can't do this doesn't then imply that I don't know anything about consciousness and have no basis on which to hold a view such as "LLMs are not conscious". Indeed the reason I know I can't define consciousness is that I can perceive it and see that I can't. That same perception of and familiarity with consciousness is what enables me to make the judgements above about humans, animals, algorithms and items of clothing.

You can of course perfectly reasonably disagree with my judgements on those things, but I hope the above makes it clear that the fact that I can't define or prove consciousness doesn't imply that I have no basis on which to make them. There is no "gotcha" in these challenges.

* I have no view on Data's consciousness as he is fictional.

My "goalpost", unmoved for decades and with nowhere to move it to, was always to independently and repeatedly make contributions to research maths. That one has now been met. That doesn't mean I suddenly think LLMs think like humans (or at all), that their way of doing maths is equivalent to or a replacement for the human one, that they are conscious, that their differences vs humans don't matter, that there will be a singularity or anything else, but it does mean I no longer have a specific, well defined "task" that I don't think they'll ever be able to do.

> At present, some frontier AI labs are testing advanced mathematical problems on proprietary models that remain inaccessible to the broader scientific community. Our recommendations are formulated with this practical context in mind.

The Navier Stokes proof came from an internal model that AFAIK still has not been released even in a limited way to scientists, let alone to the general public. Publicly available models are not what these mathematicians are talking about.

In what way are these "gatekeepers" stopping you asking an LLM questions about maths?

Air is there for all to breathe. It's a more-or-less fungible, free resource for all to use and the consumption of it is a basic requirement for life.

The AI companies, in contrast are using vast financial, human and compute resources to train and operate specialised models that are not available to the public. The advisory group's job is to give non-binding advice on how they can use this privately owned technology in a responsible manner that avoids doing unnecessary harm to the mathematical community. To call that gatekeeping misses the point entirely.