But I do think the Mitsui point is relevant; in particular, the claim that the citation is supposed to back up is:

"Moreover, even assuming that Heppner intended to share these communications with his counsel and eventually did so, it is black-letter law that non-privileged communications are not somehow alchemically changed into privileged ones upon being shared with counsel."

But the distinction Mitsui is actually making is rather different: between communications "for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice" and not; that's at best orthogonal to Rakoff's claim; and the other two cases I mentioned pretty explicitly make the opposite case: documents written with intent to share with counsel, and then actually shared with counsel seeking legal advice, are in fact covered under privilege. The assumption being that the documents are not "pre-existing", they're created as part of the process of communicating with counsel.

But yes, I agree that the "third-party" point separately undermines privilege in many contexts.

Rakoff makes two arguments against this:

- privilege was broken because Claude/Anthropic is a third party; but I don't think he successfully distinguishes Claude from say Google Docs/Translate/Gmail in this regard (he just notes that Google Docs isn't usually claimed to confer privilege on its own; but this is not the claim being made about Claude either); and see NYSBA ethics rules 820 and 842)

- he quotes Gould v Mitsui: documents do not "acquire protection merely because they were transferred" to counsel; but that same case says they do acquire protection if communicated "for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice"

> Shih, of course, is not binding on this Court, and this Court respectfully disagrees with its holding. As relevant here, the court in Shih principally concluded that the work product doctrine is not limited to materials prepared by or at the direction of an attorney. Id. But that conclusion undermines the policy animating the work product doctrine, which, as one of the cases cited in Shih explains, is "to preserve a zone of privacy in which a lawyer can prepare and develop legal theories and strategy 'with an eye toward litigation.'"

also, he quotes Gould v Mitsui: documents do not "acquire protection merely because they were transferred" to counsel; but that same case says they do acquire protection if communicated "for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice"

Comments URL: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47675721

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But the Court chose not to use those arguments, perhaps because they are less absolute and don't apply as cleanly to the draft.

Personally, I think that jury duty as it is today (no real pay, sometimes very long trials, "hardship" completely at the discretion of the judge) is actually a substantive violation of the principles of liberty that the 13th Amendment (along with the rest of the Constitution, notably the 5th Amendment) was meant to protect; (though I myself would likely enjoy actually being on a jury, and am fortunate that I can afford it/my work would likely pay).

And I don't think it would've been crazy to require an Amendment to institute a compulsory military draft, or better yet interpret the 13th Amendment to allow the draft (and jury duty) on narrower grounds but use it to better protect soldiers against various abuses inherent in the current military power structure and lack of exit option.

I do think that mandatory road duty is about as direct a violation of the purpose of the 13th Amendment as anything else the state could do. I think the (explicit) argument that the takings and due process clauses protect your money but not your labor is patently ridiculous.

Then again, according to the Supreme Court, even forced, unpaid road duty (chain gangs anyone?) is an inherent power of the government, so maybe this is ok.

> In view of ancient usage and the unanimity of judicial opinion, it must be taken as settled that, unless restrained by some constitutional limitation, a state has inherent power to require every able-bodied man within its jurisdiction to labor for a reasonable time on public roads near his residence without direct compensation.

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/240/328/

(spoiler alert: according to the ruling, the US Constitution, including Amendments, does not limit this power; and this is in fact cited as justification for upholding the draft)

Mostly as an abstraction on top of a continuous wavefunction/quantum field

> Spacetime ends up being discretizable

As far as I know this is speculative and usually assumed by physicists to be false; it's definitely not a required feature of quantum mechanics per se, and as far as I know not of any other well-accepted theory.

Note Godel's proof is mechanically exactly analogous to Turing's proof of the undecidability of the halting problem, because ultimately it's the same thing (Curry-Howard, Prolog, and all that). So you can bypass arithmetic, but you can't really bypass self-reference; just like programming languages need some looping or recursion (or equivalent expressiveness) to be Turing-complete, mathematical theories need universal quantification to be subject to Godel's Incompleteness Theorem.

Of course, you can have a physical theory that _is_ Turing-complete, say the Newtonian billiard ball model (and, y'know, we can build computers); but that doesn't mean the theory will necessarily tell you, as a static, measureable physical fact, whether a particular physical process (say, an n-body system) will ever halt or loop, or go on forever with ever-increasing complexity; so you could (in principle, in Newtonian mechanics) build some (mechanical!) physical system that simulates the Goldbach conjecture, or looks for solutions to an arbitrary Diophantine equation, but if there are no integer solutions you'll never actually be able to show it; the theory is incomplete in the mathematical sense, but just as complete a description of reality's rules.

And again, almost every statement in this paper is wrong, including the main claim

The central claim in particular is not proven because a physical theory P need not be able to express statements like "there exists a number G, which, when interpreted as the text of a theory T, essentially states that the theory T itself is unprovable in the broader physical theory P" as an empirical physical fact.

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