Sure, but the part that actually schedules where a 'job' gets run is based on a relatively simplistic tag system. Reading the yaml and plopping some job metadata into a queue-like system isn't where I would expect their issues to be, but at their scale I'm sure everything becomes fragile and inscrutable.

> imagine you schedule a job, and there's no runner available. How do you disambiguate between no runners available because you've reached capacity, runners not being available because they're on a real network with faulty connections, and runners not being available because of a faulty rollout of internal updates?

You don't need to. GitHub Actions runners, and most CI runners that I've interacted with appear to have a pull-based model where they ask for work that matches their declared tags/shape (usually platform/runtime/OS/etc.). This probably amounts to a database query, but who knows.

> A simple message queue for job scheduling is fine if you own everything and can deal with the operational overhead of identifying those cases by hand, but Github can't do that.

I highly doubt it's a simple message queue. My issue is git repos and their CI infrastructure have very low coupling to other repos or entities in most circumstances, at least conceptually, so parts of the system (ie. regions, shards, etc.) should be able to function even when others are down (ie. it shouldn't break for everyone). There's clearly centralization and coupling that isn't obvious from an outside perspective, which sorta tells me it's incidental, but that's a guess.

It is too bad they ignore that though. That's really disappointing.

They obviate the need for a user identifier as the key is itself unique, but removing the 2nd factor is a choice of the service, not the designers of the Webauthn standard.

> Also they decided they should be cloud-synchronised

The earlier versions of the spec required that the keys be resident in hardware, but it was updated to allow "roaming" keys. The important part is it's up to the service to decide on whether they want to require hardware resident keys (which cannot be synced via the cloud). Most do not.

The usability problems are actually larger than that, see sibling comments for why. Passkeys, even when cloud synced, are still better than cloud synced passwords and still give the option of hardware backed keys for those whose threat model warrants it.