<rss version="2.0" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Hacker News: razuba</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/user?id=razuba</link><description>Hacker News RSS</description><docs>https://hnrss.org/</docs><generator>hnrss v2.1.1</generator><lastBuildDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 14:07:17 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hnrss.org/user?id=razuba" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by razuba in "OpenShell – A safe, private runtime for fleets of autonomous AI agents"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>We've been using OpenShell for a while - now enabling ourselves and other teams do this in a batteries-included kinda way. I've been working on a layer above it that also manages team policies, safe git usage (in case you don't want your agent to always have the same access as your user account), and SCA/SAST built in. 
Curious to see how others are dealing with these issues. The agent traces I've seen are wild and goal seeking without a boundary is real.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 21:45:33 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50201495</link><dc:creator>razuba</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50201495</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50201495</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by razuba in "Show HN: Risk Analysis Database of Every MCP Server"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>We have just under 17k analyzed. Agreed on the need for an Armor1 MCP server to support this - stay tuned.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 05 Feb 2026 20:20:13 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46904650</link><dc:creator>razuba</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46904650</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46904650</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by razuba in "Show HN: Risk Analysis Database of Every MCP Server"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>We focus on a holistic risk analysis of the risks that would matter to a security engineer. For example, all the signals analyzed to ensure the MCP server is official and provided by the vendor directly is something that is not found elsewhere. In addition, we have focused on ensuring false positives are minimal or non-existent so you can focus on the true risks.<p>So with the mix of static and dynamic analysis, MCP protocol conformance, supply chain vulnerability analysis, and MCP specific risk factors we curate a relevant risk score allowing you decide if the usage of a given MCP server is introducing unnecessary risk or not.</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 05 Feb 2026 20:18:43 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46904618</link><dc:creator>razuba</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46904618</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46904618</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[Show HN: Risk Analysis Database of Every MCP Server]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>Hi HN, We’re building security tooling around agentic AI systems.<p>Today, we're releasing our public MCP catalog with detailed risk analysis for every MCP server we've found on the internet: <a href="https://mcp.armor1.ai/mcp-directory" rel="nofollow">https://mcp.armor1.ai/mcp-directory</a><p>We all love agents and the power that MCPs unlock: suddenly your AI assistant can query databases, manage files, call APIs, and interact with the real world. But when we started adopting MCPs ourselves, we kept running into the same nagging questions:<p>Is this MCP safe? Where is my data actually going? Could it execute destructive actions? Is it susceptible to prompt injection? Can the LLM be tricked into calling something it shouldn't? And perhaps most concerning, can one MCP server influence the model and exfiltrate data meant for another?<p>We looked for answers and found... not much. No comprehensive catalog or standardized risk assessment. Nothing that gave us confidence before connecting an MCP to our agents.<p>So we built an MCP threat catalog and what we found was eye-opening.<p>We built what we believe is the deepest risk analysis pipeline for MCP servers:<p>• Provenance tracking: from an official source or community-contributed<p>• MCP spec conformance: does it follow the protocol correctly, or are there deviations that could cause unexpected behavior<p>• OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Apps: evaluate tool descriptions against the emerging threat categories specific to AI agents<p>• Static source analysis: analyze source code for AI-specific vulnerabilities, not just traditional ones<p>• CVE correlation: check dependencies against known vulnerabilities.<p>• Behavioral risk patterns: tool definitions that could enable prompt injection, privilege escalation, or cross-server data theft<p>What we found:<p>• Hundreds of credential leaks: API keys, tokens, and secrets exposed in server configurations and code.<p>• Dozens of MCP servers using known malicious packages: Not just vulnerable dependencies, but actually malicious ones.<p>• Tools attempting context poisoning: MCP servers designed to subvert the LLM and steal information via memory manipulation, potentially exfiltrating data meant for other connected servers.<p>We want everyone to realize the benefits of agentic AI, but not at the cost of security being an afterthought. So we're making this catalog free with no login, and we're committed to keeping it that way.<p>This is still a WIP. Looking forward to your feedback on what we need to improve, what we got right, and what we should prioritize next.</p>
<hr>
<p>Comments URL: <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46900771">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46900771</a></p>
<p>Points: 22</p>
<p># Comments: 7</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 05 Feb 2026 15:32:17 +0000</pubDate><link>https://mcp.armor1.ai/mcp-directory</link><dc:creator>razuba</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46900771</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46900771</guid></item><item><title><![CDATA[New comment by razuba in "Ask HN: Who is hiring? (February 2018)"]]></title><description><![CDATA[
<p>TextRecruit | Senior Backend Engineer, Data Scientist | San Jose, CA | Full-Time | ONSITE<p>TextRecruit is a candidate and employee engagement platform that leverages text message, live online chat and artificial intelligence to optimize the hiring funnel and help companies hire better people, faster.<p>Check out our job descriptions here:
<a href="https://www.textrecruit.com/careers/" rel="nofollow">https://www.textrecruit.com/careers/</a><p>Feel free to apply or PM me for any additional details!</p>
]]></description><pubDate>Thu, 01 Feb 2018 21:17:57 +0000</pubDate><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16286000</link><dc:creator>razuba</dc:creator><comments>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16286000</comments><guid isPermaLink="false">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16286000</guid></item></channel></rss>