As far as carbon neutrality goes, you’re drawing a conclusion about the value based only on the first derivative. If you hold livestock numbers constant (they’re increasing, alas, but let’s not worry about that yet) then there will be a rough equilibrium. However, the gas is in the atmosphere for some time until it gets fixed back into the soil, and continues to have a warming effect in the meantime.

Any carbon tax has to punish emissions. Net zero emissions isn’t enough anymore.

In such a scenario a VPN is a more secure answer than DNS-over-TLS, but this isn’t a realistic answer for the average user. It has to be something that is free and easy to enable.

It appeared to me that the golang devs believed so strongly in the superiority of leap second smearing that waiting for everyone to adopt it was better than compromising their API or the implementation of time.Time.

While I trust the author to do this (thankfully, as he's my coworker) there is a lot of Linux software that doesn't, even assuming it was updated in the last year and you're running something vaguely bleeding edge (not Debian).

Destination IP is a reasonable addition to the hash function, however.

It works out the same for the application: 1 fd or 16k fds doesn't really matter if you're using epoll, and that single fd can accept connections to any of those 16k IP addresses.

1. It's a charity tax; you have to convince people to incur the cost of Tor (i.e. CAPTCHAs everywhere) for activities that don't require Tor.

2. You can't neutralise a poison by diluting it.

Firstly, from the operators' POV, if there's a widespread agreement that people use Tor even though they don't need to, then they know voluntary users can be pressured not to use Tor through sheer inconvenience. Even if you wanted to boycott a service that blocked Tor, it's notoriously hard to make good on that threat unless you wield a lot of power or annoyed a very large number of people. So the consequences are minor.

Secondly, the percentage of malicious Tor traffic is a red herring. What operators care about is the origins of malicious traffic. If 50% of your attacks come from one particular country (or Tor) and the cost of losing that traffic is less than the cost of that malicious traffic, there is a real incentive to block that traffic. Combined with the first point, the cost of losing voluntary Tor users is insignificant if they can easily choose not to use it.