However, the "13-20%" that you're quoting is a dishonest propaganda number itself. It's the false positive rate that a single small company (Yubo) reported. The reported false positive rates of other companies are between 0.32% and 1.5%, which is still a high error rate in absolute numbers.

Just to be clear: the report itself is full of uncertainty, convenient half truths and false causality. They for example completely rely on Big Tech platforms themselves to count false positives when a moderation decision was reversed. Microsoft apparently even claims that no user ever appealed against a decision ("No appeals reported"). There is no independent investigation into the effectiveness of the regulation at all, while it is in direct conflict with fundamental rights and required to be proportional to its goals.

The section about "children identified" is also a complete mess where most countries can't even report the most basic data, and it isn't clear if mass surveillance contributed anything to new cases at all. But somehow they still conclude "voluntary reporting in line with this Regulation appears to make a significant contribution to the protection of a large number of children", which seems extremely baseless.

[1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_instituti...

- In 2021 the European Parliament voted in favor of a temporary regulation that allowed companies to (i.e. voluntarily) scan private communications. Let's call it Chat Control 1.0. They chose to enact this because US companies were already scanning private messages in violation of the ePrivacy Directive which had come into force in the previous year. Instead of enforcing this directive, they chose to (temporarily) legalize the scanning of private messages while preparing more permanent legislation.

- In 2024 Chat Control 1.0 was extended for another 2 years. An amendment was adopted that explicitly noted that after this time "[the regulation] shall lapse permanently".

- From 2022 to 2025 the European Commission (together with member states) has proposed mandatory scanning, later updated with a proposal for client-side scanning (defeating end to end encryption), AI classification of image and text content, age verification and a lot of other invasive measures. This is what is known as Chat Control 2.0. The European Parliament has again and again voted against this proposal.

- In 2025/2026 the European Commission finally (temporarily) backed down from Chat Control 2.0 and instead proposed to extend Chat Control 1.0 for another 2 years, but has completely failed to negotiate with parliament to adopt a text that explicitly puts fundamental rights up front, something that a majority of the European Parliament had asked for since 2021.

- In response to this, the Civil Liberties Committee of the European Parliament tabled amendments [1] that explicitly limits the regulation to the subject matter and prevents it from being used to weaken end-to-end encryption. Many of these amendments were adopted.

- Consequently, many conservative members of the European Parliament voted down the entire extension of the regulation. They apparently felt that it was better to let the regulation expire so that they gain more negotiation power to adopt a version of the regulation that the has less safeguards or contains measures like in Chat Control 2.0.

[1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/LIBE-AM-784377...

(while hallucinating the events of the day in a very weird way; it would be fun to 'wake up' the agent in the middle of such a session and commit the 'dream' to a notebook again)

[1] https://github.com/enricoros/big-AGI (no affiliation)

Can you expand on this or source this? I'm quite interested in OpenCloud, and haven't heard anything about this. I searched for a few keywords (espionage, legal, lawsuit), which only lands your comment on top.

You're apparently missing the two points I made in the post you are replying to, or at the very least you're not responding to them. By which I don't mean to say they are necessarily valid points.

[1] https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/commit/0cc906d07e73...

Also, the ambiguity is not only in the "you may be" part, but also in the "to create compiled versions" part. Open source is more than creating compiled versions of source code.

They should be glad the copy protection is not more in the style of "The Games: Winter Challenge", where playing a pirated copy would make it subtly impossible to play many levels [1]. Would be 'fun' if the exported accounting data would contain all kinds of subtle errors.

[1] https://mrwint.github.io/winter/writeup/writeup.html

[1] https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrest_RuneScape

As for the existence of "censors" that don't "allow" you to see anything. That's not how this site works, and your lack of carefulness stating that leads me to downvote that.

As much as I hate that anything regarding the rise of fascism in the US get's insta-flagged (by a community, not a "censor"), it's still very easy to find such posts, for example on an aggregator [1] and on the /active subpage you just mentioned.

It will also be broadly shared on regular (social) media, which is an oft stated reason this kind of stories get flagged by the community, although I think there are many other reasons.

[1] https://hckrnews.com

You will need camera DRM with a hardware security module down all the way to the image sensor, where the hardware is in the hands of the attacker. Even when that chain is unbroken, you'll need to detect all kinds of tricks where the incoming photons themselves are altered. In the simplest case: a photo of a photo.

If HDCP has taught anything, it's that vendors of consumer products cannot implement such a secure chain at all, with ridiculous security vulnerabilities for years. HDCP has been given up and has become mostly irrelevant, perhaps except for the criminal liability it places on 'breaking' it. Vendors are also pushed to rely on security by obscurity, which will make such vulnerabilities harder to find for researchers than for attackers.

If you have half of such a 'signed photos' system in place, it will become easier to dismiss photos of actual events on the basis that they're unsigned. If a camera model or security chip shared by many models turns out to be broken, or a new photo-of-a-photo trick becomes known, a huge amount of photos produced before that, become immediately suspect. If you gatekeep (the proper implementations of) these features only to professional or expensive models, citizen journalism will be disincentivized.

But even more importantly: if you choose to rely on technical measures that are poorly understood by the general public (and that are likely to blow up in your face), you erode a social system of trust that already is in place, which is journalism. Although the rise of social media, illiteracy and fascism tends to suggest otherwise, journalistic chain of custody of photographic records mainly works fine. But only if we keep maintaining and teaching that system.

It doesn't seem unlikely to me that YC coined or at least popularized 'the pivot' in the context of changing business / startup directions. The first mention of using the word in that sense is in this comment [1] which explicitly mentions the usage by YC, while it only gets used when talking about pivot tables or more traditional uses of the word before that.

Edit: The "Lean Startup" blog series [2], which was quite influential, mentions 'the pivot' a little earlier than the post above, and really seems to coin it, so I guess that's the source (edit again: wrong :D).

[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=806601

[2] https://www.startuplessonslearned.com/2009/06/pivot-dont-jum...

This makes little sense. Recovering a random preimage of an MD5 hash is marginally easier [1] than a (128-bit truncated) SHA256 hash, but this won't recover any sensible message.

Recovering a sensible (short) message is equally hard for both hashes.

[1] https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-01001-9_...

Because I thought some kind of curious conversation would be possible with the reply you made. The two other examples you posted are devoid of anything interesting; hopeless cases.

I should have consulted your posting history however, which consists mainly of short, combative and indignant responses like the one you just directed at me.

> it would be incredibly economically beneficial to the US

I fail to see how this is the case. The US and US companies have always been welcome to bid on mining concessions (at least, until recently), but the reality is that it's hardly profitable to do so, as there are ample cheaper opportunities available elsewhere.

Also, "assuming control" seems to be a euphemism for "invading" as the US buying Greenland is squarely out of the question. Invading is hardly humble, indeed, and you seem to be all too confident that such invading will allow for a republic and not lead to autocracy.