> if we confuse fluency at generating text with consciousness or moral agency, we’re at risk of assigning responsibility to entirely the wrong parties whenever anyone uses a chatbot

Consciousness is independent of "assigning responsibility". Dogs cannot take responsibility for their actions but I believe they are conscious.

> we would never conclude that the LLM has conjured up digital re-creations of Julius Caesar and Genghis Khan, nor would we suggest that the historical figures are conscious despite being disembodied and are happily conversing in a language that neither actually spoke. In reality, they are just characters in a piece of speculative fiction

This is a straw man. The obvious pro-consciousness claim would be that the LLM is the author of the fictional characters, and that the relationship between the LLM and Julius Caesar is analogous to the relationship between a human author and their fictional creations.

> Did changing the names of the characters from historical figures to generic roles cause the LLM to conjure up conscious entities who possess subjective experience?

No, again the LLM writing the text could potentially have a consciousness separate from the characters it authors.

> Some years ago it was briefly popular to play games with your phone’s predictive-text feature; [...] It would be possible to interact with a contemporary LLM this way, and the resulting sentences would be perfectly sensible, but you probably wouldn’t feel like you were talking with someone.

Yes, the same substrate is capable of hosting conscious and non-conscious forms, just like some arrangements of neurons are conscious, and some are not.

> But if the Caesar character were to become dispirited by something that the Khan character said, we shouldn’t become concerned in the slightest.

Even when there are characters, there may be actors behind the characters, for whom we could say "there is something it is to be like".

> we don’t need to worry if the transcript includes sentences where the chatbot character is sad. (We might need to worry if those sentences provoke sadness in the human user, but that’s a separate issue.)

It's actually not a separate issue. The LLM and the human are both adding sentences to the transcript. From the transcript we can make inferences about the mental state of the human. If the LLM has mental states, we could make inferences about those too.

> And note that it’s entirely possible for you to write five pages of dialogue between Caesar and Khan and then have an LLM extend the conversation; neither character had subjective experience when you were writing them, and that doesn’t change when you hand the task off to an LLM.

It's almost like he wants to make my point for me with this sentence.

> Being open to the possibility that LLMs are conscious is the same as being open to the possibility that Microsoft Word is conscious

This smug shit really makes me angry for some reason. "Openness", i.e. uncertainty in the face of a completely novel situation, in the face of eons long struggle of humanity to understand what consciousness is and how it works, is just being naive.

> Should you consider the possibility that every time you open a Word document you are bringing multiple conscious interlocutors into existence, and every time you close one you snuff their existence out?

No, but if I find a word document I very well might try to use the signs it contains to make inferences about the mental state of its author.

> we are accustomed to reading intention into sentences, whereas we are not accustomed to reading intention into the way that amino acids fold into protein molecules.

He's trying to have it both ways here. Both that "obviously protein folding models aren't conscious because they don't emit sentences", but also "you are a rube for being tricked into thinking LLM models are conscious, because they do emit sentences".

> Obviously I’m describing a process that mimics the path terrestrial evolution took; is this the only possible route to conscious computer programs that use language? Maybe not, but any proposed alternative will need a truly enormous amount of supporting evidence for it to deserve serious consideration

OK, that's fine for the author to not to be convinced, but that's not what's happening here, instead the author wrote a whole argument being convinced of the opposite viewpoint.

> It’s not plausible to me that a development path where the first step is a sentence-continuation machine that emits bad Julius Caesar dialogue and the next step is a sentence-continuation machine that emits decent Julius Caesar dialogue is one with a conscious Julius Caesar—or consciousness of any sort—as its endpoint

Actually a lot of things have happened? There were clearly many steps along they way from your phone's autocomplete to where we are now.

I think it also helps to sharpen this debate to remember that there is a moral dimension: many have adopted moral systems that widen their sphere of concern and care from the self to the community to the nation to the whole of mankind, usually under the intuitive precept that it is bad to make someone else experience suffering. Should we expand our moral conception of responsibility or care to non-human patients, and if so, which?

Total drivel. Consciousness in biological systems is "a given" because of metabolism?