Which is what you'd expect if you're exporting more than importing. Perhaps you meant by some other accounting, which is what I was alluding to regarding the distortion caused by gold convertibility. Ceteris paribus, the trade & account balance will zero out over time in the absence of some kind of regulatory or similar distortion. China doesn't need to be a net importer to become a reserve currency, but if they became one (deliberately or otherwise) and allowed their currency to float than in time their exports would tend to fall and they'd likely become a net importer, at least if they became the dominant reserve like the US. (If they didn't float, you'd get a mess like the US had.) The reserve status can drive the balance of trade toward net importing. Which is precisely why China doesn't really want to become a global reserve currency. They'd certainly like the soft power that would bring, but they don't want the domestic employment disruption the US suffers from. That doesn't stop them from wanting their cake and eating it, too; they can try, but nobody really believes they could, so nobody takes it seriously. Though it's not necessarily an all or nothing deal. I'm not sure the world needs a single reserve currency as dominant as the dollar. We have markets to arbitrage and balance currency valuations, including future expected valuations. A singular dominant reserve currency is helpful to reduce friction, but less so when you have huge, global currency and currency derivatives markets constantly trading.

A secret criminal prosecution trial would be unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial"). Though SCOTUS has unfortunately allowed for some classified material to be kept secret, sometimes (IIRC) even from the defendant and the jury, though usually this is ancillary stuff, not the direct evidence that would secure a conviction.

That's the epitome of the hidden code downside that Linus and many others dislike about C++. For constructors and destructors it's somewhat unavoidable and not so random, though Rust does better at limiting the blast radius of non-local code, at least in the drop case.

If they didn't want to adopt the C11 rule, the C++ committee should've explored a rule that required the compiler to emit a diagnostic or error for trivial loops (whether as defined by C11 or otherwise), requiring the programmer to explicitly insert ::yield or similar. No hidden code, and less opportunity for the compiler to do surprising things.

The C committee has been rigorously enumerating UB cases in the standard and addressing each case in turn, often by requiring a diagnostic, error, or by turning it into implemention defined behavior. But inserting code like that would be unthinkable.

The client phone app tells your XMPP server which gateway to use (or maybe it's vice-versa, the gateway contacts your server. I forget). In any event XMPP servers like Prosody support this out-of-the-box.

1) Traffic-related laws straddle the boundary between civil/regulatory law and criminal law. Someone losing their driver's license or even paying a penalty for involuntary intoxication would still be consonant with criminal law principles. However, a criminal punishment would be aberrational. (Distinction between a civil penalty and criminal punishment usually turns on whether there's a moral purpose to the sanction. Jail time is usually but not always--cf civil contempt incarceration--considered a criminal punishment.)

2) Background principles notwithstanding, in theory a state could completely dispense with any morality-colored mens rea requirement, just as the UK Parliament could do whatever it wants to. The backstop would be Federal constitutional [substantive] due process guarantees.

2.a) Some quick searching shows that Texas nominally seems to have dispensed with this requirement for DWIs. See e.g. Farmer v. State, 411 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) and some discussion at https://www.ncdd.com/top-dui-attorneys-blog/involuntary-into... Without having fully read the case law, though (but some summaries of that and other cases), I suspect there might be some nuance that has allowed this to stand without a full majority accepting that the traditional principles have been completely thrown out. For example, even if someone didn't know they were taking Ambien, the simple act of voluntarily taking any pill without careful examination can be construed as a sufficiently culpable act. Still, it's a pretty big caveat.

2.b) Statutory rape is a classic strict liability crime. But most states will permit a mistake-of-fact defense. Some don't, but even there there's sometimes some nuance and rationalizing going on and the literature is crazy complex. Because this is a "think of the children" situation, most case will just have horrible facts.

3) A few states have nominally dispensed with insanity defenses, though Kansas stands out the most. SCOTUS upheld Kansas' law in Kahler v. Kansas, but in the majority opinion Kagan characterized the Kansas law as not abolishing the insanity defense but rather changing its shape, and she showed that there still remained elements for which a defendant could plea lacked the requisite intent. Also, regarding the Federal constitution acting as backstop, she reiterated that SCOTUS was reticent to establish strict metes & bounds about the general principles of criminal law that states could not stray beyond. Nonetheless, those principles clearly exist.

I had some other points, but now I've forgotten them. Also, minor pedantic point, but like "strict liability crime", some scholars consider "affirmative defense" to be oxymoronic. As a substantive matter there's not a strong distinction. It's a procedural distinction about initial burdens of proof, but in most if not all cases you can interpret an affirmative defense as simply placing a very weak initial burden on the prosecution that is implicitly met.

(Note, I'm not a practicing lawyer but do have a law degree.)

EDIT: Ah, point 4) Intent was a big sticking point in the Obamacare penalty case, Sebelius. Both the dissent and Roberts (the swing vote) reiterated that you couldn't have a penalty or punishment for doing nothing. (IIRC some of the majority opinions also echoed this.) That is, even in a civil context there has some to be some voluntary act, however remote, that puts someone in a position to be subject to legal liability. But as Roberts pointed out, the taxing power is the great exception, where you can be required to do something merely for existing, and thus penalized for not doing nothing properly. (And Roberts was the critical swing vote.)

EDIT EDIT: Also see, "Solving General and Specific Intent: A Mapping on the MPC and Applications to the Categorical Approach", https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4754469 In describing the distinctions between general and specific intent in criminal law, it also delves into the definitions of strict criminal liability (which can be construed as either very similar or identical to general intent crimes), and notes that SCOTUS generally inserts an implicit mens rea requirement when considering strict liability criminal statutes.

The strict liability means once you choose to become intoxicated, you're liable for driving intoxicated, even if in some other context your intoxication would mean you couldn't form the requisite intent for something, e.g. have sex.

If there's too much distance between the act you intend to do and the strict liability acts that complete the crime, then the crime would be considered unconstitutional.

Criminal law in common law systems emerged from tort law, so there are many parallels, including the notion of strict liability. (Thus the old axiom about crimes being an offense to the king, specifically an injury to the peaceful society he's ostensibly trying to maintain.) But criminal law has a moral dimension that is absent or muted in other areas, so strict liability could never be as expansive as in tort law or regulatory law.

I don't remember if GCJ supported loading and running code dynamically with a built-in JIT or interpreter. I think it was just pure AOT, which caused some compatibility headaches.

Removing liability might incentivize more people to, e.g., drive their car to a bar. I'm not sure that's a good thing. Maybe great for bars and restaurants, or possibly quality of life, but removing liability probably has other unintended consequences.

It's maybe too early tell whether criminal liability should be changed, or at least how it should be changed. If criminal liability had been removed when Tesla started making their extravagant self-driving claims, surely you'd agree it would have been too soon, and potentially resulted in more accidents. Few if any consumer autonomous driving modes are as reliable as Waymo

Absent statutory changes, common law tort will probably evolve in some states to take into consideration new incentives and norms, and that might help point the way for changes in criminal law. Those policy changes are typically driven by courts wrestling with real world cases, whereas de novo legislative changes are often driven by imaginations and lobbying.

You can disagree with Madison, but he certainly wasn't ignorant about these questions. He just felt positive rights were better secured through dynamic legislative processes within a stable and responsive democratic framework. The hard part is trying to maintain a responsive democracy. Without that positive rights are empty promises, anyhow, as they often are in these newer constitutions. One of the problems with making promises you can't keep is it delegitimizes government, which furthers the normalization of corruption and unlawfulness.

I guess maybe the semantics of ZSTs complicate the aliasing story a tad?

So do you agree or not agree that mandatory penal slavery is an extension of 19th century and earlier American slavery. Because that's what the movement and rhetoric are saying. And removing the Exception Clause won't change the rhetoric, because the entire point is to argue "things haven't changed".

It's the same rhetoric that equivocates "wage slavery". All those things can, of course, fall under a literal definition of slavery. Just like all forms of misbehavior by politicians can be called corruption. We can say, well, Trump isn't doing anything every other politician hasn't done. Which can be literally true. But I choose not to play semantic games like that, because those semantic games are at least as likely to be used to excuse abuses as they are to prevent them. If you want reform, pursue reform. Note that many states have removed their state constitutional Exceptions Clauses which by itself resulted in zero changes to the status quo, because when you play semantic games there's always room to redefine things on-the-fly, or to find another semantic loophole. Every court knew what the Exceptions Clause actual, contextual meaning was, and can just as well redefine slavery or non-slavery to exclude or include penal labor. Semantic games don't change the real world, except insofar as they promote cynicism, confusion, and disengagement from substantive issues.

The norm now is to require a wage for mandatory labor, but of course often it's just a pittance. (Only 6 US states have uncompensated labor.) But even when you require minimum wage, many criminals owe restitution, so it could be and is taken away again.

Many US states have penal labor systems just like in Europe, that is nominally opt out, mandatory wages, etc, but at the end of the day it's always open to accusations of coercion and claims of "slavery".

The rhetoric around the 13th Amendment is exactly why we're in the situation we are now politically. Everything is equivocated to maximize rhetorical impact. Every unethical thing a politician does is "corruption", so when you get open and egregious corruption as with Trump, people can't discriminate and assume it's all the same.

Was penal labor abused to roll back the clock on abolition? Yes. Is penal labor abused today? Yes. But calling it slavery, drawing parallels to chattel slavery, is just irresponsible.